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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a five-Justice majority of the United States Supreme Court has
adopted new limits on congressional power as the grounds for invalidating an
extraordinary number of federal laws. The diverse range of laws declared
unconstitutional (in whole, significant part, or application) include congressional
efforts to: allow the victims of rape and other gender-motivated violence to sue their
attackers;' allow state employees to sue for disability and age discrimination; 2 impose
federal criminal penalties for the possession of guns near schools; 3 direct local law
enforcement officers to do background checks on prospective gun purchasers for
possible criminal convictions;4 and preserve the uniformity of our intellectual property
laws by making states liable for the intentional infringement of patents.5 The Court has
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. I am grateful for the advice
and support of colleagues and friends, including Patrick Baude, Jeannine Bell, Daniel Conkle,
Charles Geyh, Martin Lederman and Lauren Robel, and the other participants in this
Symposium. I also thank my research assistants, Michelle Branigan, Cyril Emery, and Jacob
Sheehan, for their excellent work.
1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (the Violence Against Women Act).
2. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
4. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act).
5. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Classification Act); see also City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); infra text accompanying
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derived these limits, which are not found in the constitutional text, from the Court's
conceptions of state sovereignty and judicial supremacy.
The Court's recent cases contrast sharply with its precedent of more than fifty
years, during which the Court adhered to broad and deferential views of congressional
power and rarely found a law even close to Congress's constitutional limits. Professors
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson place the Rehnquist Court's contraction of
congressional power at the core of a "constitutional revolution."6 Judge John T.
Noonan, Jr. describes these cases as "boldly innovative" and "extraordinary"-as well
as illogical, unprincipled, unworkable, and unjust.7 Professor Mark Tushnet suggests
an alternative to what he describes as "alarmist" assessments: a "modest" view that
emphasizes both the limited practical impact of the Court's rulings thus far, and also
that Congress, at least at present, retains powers that would permit it to achieve almost
all of its objectives.8
Whether or not a "constitutional revolution" is under way, all signs to date suggest
that the Court has embarked on a course of substantial changes in the structure of our
constitutional government. 9 The structural changes most widely discussed relate to
notes 213-55 (discussing the Court's decisions in the cases cited supra notes 1-5).
6. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA.
L. REv. 1045 (2001); see also Sylvia A. Law, In the Name ofFederalism: The Supreme Court's
Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CN. L. REv. 367, 370 (2002) (critiquing the
"federalism revolution" in which "a bare majority of the Supreme Court seeks to reverse six
decades of settled federalism jurisprudence"); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court and the
Triumph ofDiscord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,2001, § 4, at 1 (discussing record number of five-four
Supreme Court decisions, and concluding "[tjhere is a revolution in progress at the [C]ourt").
7. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 2-11, 156 (2002).
8. See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78
IND. L.J. 47, 49-52 (2003). Professor Tushnet, though, devotes Part II of his article to explaining
why Congress is unlikely to exercise those powers to enact new legislation. See id. at 56-63. The
Court also has emphasized the limited nature of its rulings. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (quoted infra note 240).
9. The Justices themselves have acknowledged the extraordinary nature of the Court's recent
federalism decisions, with the dissenters pledging not to accede to the majority and to disregard
the standard rule of stare decisis. Justice Stevens, for example, wrote in dissent in Kimel:
Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as
controlling precedent. First and foremost, the reasoning of that opinion is so
profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers'
conception of the constitutional order that it has foresaken any claim to the usual
deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996)); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1889 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued dissent .... "); Linda
Greenhouse, 5-4, Now and Forever: At the Court, Dissent Over States 'Rights Is Now War, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 4, at 3 [hereinafter 5-4, Now and Forever] ("There are dissenting
opinions at the Supreme Court, and then there are declarations of war. These days, federalism
means war.").
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist set this tone back in 1985 when he predicted in dissent
that a future Court would overrule the Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,
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federalism-that is, the allocation of powers between the national government and the
states. Equally at stake, and increasingly noted, are the relative authorities of the three
branches of the national government.
The Court has significantly limited Congress's ability to legislate, especially in
ways that effectively bind the states, through the adoption of narrow views of
Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause and
through expansive views of state sovereignty. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court has held that only the judiciary, and not Congress, may define the
substantive reach of the Amendment's provisions. Moreover, the Court will carefully
scrutinize congressional attempts to protect even those rights recognized by the Court.
The Court held, for example, that because it had interpreted the guarantee of equal
protection to afford only minimal protection for persons with disabilities, Congress had
exceeded its authority to enforce that equal protection guarantee when, through the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress provided far greater protections against
disability discrimination.10 At the same time, the Court has narrowed Congress's
commerce power by creating new limits on Congress's ability to regulate what the
Court views as noneconomic activity."
Even where the Court continues to recognize affirmative congressional power to
legislate, it has erected new barriers to Congress's ability to impose national standards
on the states, through new sovereign immunity 2 and anticommandeering doctrines.
3
For example, because the Court both narrowly construed Congress's power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment and also declared in 1996 that Congress may not abrogate
states' sovereign immunity pursuant to its commerce power, Congress may not
authorize state employees to seek money damages for disability or age employment
discrimination. 14
The Court's new direction thus involves issues of both federalism and the
separation of powers: two pillars of our constitutional structure. The end result is a
judiciary with expanded, self-proclaimed authority to say what the Constitution means,
and a Congress significantly diminished in its ability to set national policy, to protect
important rights and interests, and to participate in the process of constitutional
interpretation. Most immediately threatened is Congress's ability to protect certain
civil rights and environmental interests, in general and especially as against state
entities (including public universities). Again, future decisions will determine the full
extent of the constitutional change,"3 but at this point even more striking than the
426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-74; see also Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Significantly, the Court continues to recognize broad congressional power to regulate the
national economy, including intrastate economic activity with interstate effects.
12. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (in federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (in
state court).
13. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
14. See generally Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Kimel, 528 U.S. 62.
15. The Court may provide additional guidance this Term in its review of Congress's Section
5 authority to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). See Hibbs v. Dep't of
Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub nom., Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
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immediate practical ramifications of the Court's specific holdings is the Court's
substantially changed stance on fundamental questions of the constitutional allocation
of powers.'
6
Most directly engaged in constitutional struggle are the Court and Congress. The
relationship between these two branches understandably has dominated academic and
public debate about the Court's congressional power jurisprudence. Far less examined
and appreciated is the role in this conflict of the remaining branch of the federal
government: the Executive. Presidents possess many powers that require interpretation
of the Constitution and that thus may be used to influence the development of
constitutional meaning. Most generally, the President is obliged to "preserve, protect,
and defend" the Constitution.' 7 With regard to the development of the law of
congressional power and federalism, Presidents have played multiple, sometimes
contradictory roles. The executive branch, for example, defended Congress in the
litigation before the Court that resulted in the new limits on Congress. The Solicitor
General, the President's top litigator, urged the Court throughout much of the 1990s-
albeit unsuccessfully-to adhere to the post-1937 Court's broad, deferential views of
congressional power.
And yet, the most notable recent presidential roles were those of architect and
promoter of these very limits on congressional power. Ironically, the Rehnquist
Court's adherence to a strong version of judicial supremacy, which seeks to deny
Congress and other nonjudicial actors (including the President) a significant role in
determining constitutional meaning, can be traced to a President who did challenge the
Court's constitutional views-a President who ultimately was quite successful in
substituting his own views for what he saw as the very wrong views of the Supreme
Court of his time. In particular, the roots of the Rehnquist Court's new direction, at
least in significant part, can be found in the "Reagan revolution."' 8
President Reagan's administration, and most notably his Attorney General, Edwin
Meese III, advocated and pursued a strong and independent presidential voice in the
development of the law. Some, but not all, of the Reagan campaign to change the law
was very public and at the time provoked considerable controversy and academic
commentary. Reagan, for example, pledged to appoint judges who would practice
v. Hibbs, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding that the FMLA was within Congress's Section 5
authority to remedy and prevent gender discrimination). But see Kazmnier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d
519 (5th Cir. 2000) (reaching opposite conclusion).
16. See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 7, at 12 (describing "the very large numbers potentially
affected adversely by the court's decisions-for example, the 4.5 million employees of the fifty
states and state-related entities; the over 5 million holders of patents; the 10 million holders of
trademarks; the 100 million holders of copyright; the over 150 million believers in faiths whose
requirements can transcend the interest of government; and the one-half of the population
distinguished by gender as women"); Law, supra note 6, at 402 (examining "practical effects of
the Supreme Court's federalism revolution").
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
18. See President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation, II PUB. PAPERS 1718,
1720 (Jan. 11, 1989) (referring to the "Reagan revolution"); see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER
AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991) (describing
legal aspects of the "Reagan revolution").
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"judicial restraint" and who understood the "danger" of "judicial activism." 9
Not generally known at the time was the extensive work of Reagan's Department of
Justice, which set forth in great detail the administration's vision of the law, as well as
strategies to attain that vision, in a series of official reports. These reports analyzed a
wide range of constitutional and other legal issues and identified Supreme Court
doctrine the administration viewed as wrong. One report even included lists of Court
decisions "inconsistent" with the Reagan administration's interpretations. 20 The
constitutional doctrines targeted for change involved the most pressing and
controversial issues of the day, including abortion, affirmative action, religion, and, the
subject of this Article and a centerpiece of the Reagan agenda, congressional power
and federalism. The Reagan administration sought to limit Congress's most significant
powers-the commerce power, the authority to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments, and the spending power-and to expand judicial protection of state
sovereignty.
Officials in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations promoted these
views in various ways. By far the most successful means was through their judicial
appointments and especially appointments to the Supreme Court. Together, Presidents
Reagan and Bush appointed four of the five Justices sometimes referred to as the
"federalism five," and elevated the fifth to Chief Justice. Since 1995, the Rehnquist
Court has begun adopting theories of congressional power and federalism strikingly
similar to those developed in the reports of the Reagan Justice Department. One of
those reports was devoted to the critical role ofjudicial appointments in shaping the
development of the law.2'
Reagan, of course, was not the first President to attempt and achieve a substantial
shift in important judicial doctrine. Even at the time some compared his efforts to those
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, though some earlier assessments emphasized Reagan's
relative failure, as of that time, to promote his views.22 Some prominent recent
19. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 301 (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial
Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 326 (1987); Bernard Weinraub,
Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985,
at A l; see also GOLDMAN, supra, at 285-345.
20. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
21. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1988) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000].
22. For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman wrote in 1988:
Like Ronald Reagan, Franklin Roosevelt won re-election on a political program
that repudiated a complex body of constitutional principle developed by a
generation and more of Supreme Court justices. Like Reagan, Roosevelt despaired
of changing the Constitution by mobilizing the people to enact formal amendments
in the way described by article V. Instead, he sought to change the path of
constitutional law by making transformative judicial appointments.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: Transformative
Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1166 (1988). Professor Ackerman at the time
concluded that "[u]nlike Reagan, Roosevelt succeeded." Id. Ackerman in 1998 again compared
President Roosevelt's and President Reagan's attempts to change constitutional meaning
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assessments continue to decline to credit Reagan for the constitutional change adopted
by the Rehnquist Court. Judge Noonan, for example, wrote in 2002 that "Presidents
and parties will not explain the votes ' 23 of the five Justices for what he describes as the
Court's usurpation of congressional power.
24
The little-examined Reagan reports of the late 1980s and the Rehnquist Court
decisions since 1995 permit a more complete evaluation of Reagan's efforts and degree
of success. They confirm that the comparison between Reagan and Roosevelt is apt:
Reagan was among the handful of presidents most critical of judicial exclusivity in
constitutional interpretation and most supportive of presidential interpretative
independence (even as he sought to diminish Congress's interpretive role). The Court's
current hostility toward congressional constitutional interpretation itself is a
remarkable example of successful nonjudicial-here, presidential--efforts to remake
constitutional law. Although Reagan's success was not as immediate as Roosevelt's,
and even today remains substantially less complete, congressional power and
federalismwere central targets of change for the Reagan administration, and on these
issues the Rehnquist Court's decisions closely match the positions detailed in the
Department of Justice reports.
25
Before I turn to the Reagan/Rehnquist constitutional changes in the law of
congressional power, I will describe in Part 11 the modem development of the Court's
views on congressional power and federalism prior to President Reagan's election. I
through transformative appointments. See 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 389-403 (1998), and discussion infra note 263; see also JAMES F. SIMON,
THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 11 (1995) ("This is
the story of a conservative judicial revolution that failed. It was led by the chief justice of the
United States, William H. Rehnquist, and actively encouraged by two conservative Republican
presidents, Ronald Reagan and George Bush."); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley,
UnfulfilledAspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bushi 57 ALB. L.
REV. I 111, 1113 (1994) ("Although the fortuitous timing of five Justices' departures enabled
conservative Republican Presidents to pack the Court with carefully selected appointees, Reagan
and Bush ultimately failed to achieve complete fulfillment of their objectives .... [T]he
opportunity for and appearance of 'Court packing' do not necessarily produce the intended
results .... ."). But see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6; discussion infra notes 258-64 and
accompanying text.
23. NOONAN, supra note 7, at 8. More fully, Judge Noonan wrote: "Newspapers like to
predict outcomes of cases in terms of the president who appointed the judges. It's a crude
predictive device. Far more important is the life experience of each judge.... Presidents and
parties will not explain the votes. . . ." Id.
24. Id. passim.
25. When asked in 2000 what he regarded as "the Reagan Administration's biggest
originalist success in litigation," former Attorney General Meese cited the Rehnquist Court's
treatment of congressional power and federalism, and also affirmative action. Edwin Meese III,
Dialogue, Reagan's Legal Revolutionary, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 193, 199 (2000). This Article will
not assess the success of the Reagan administration on the many other constitutional issues
targeted for change by the Reagan Department of Justice reports, but notes the record is mixed.
Meese cited as "the Administration's most disappointing loss," its "failure to persuade the Court.
.. to overrule Roe v. Wade." Id. Meese also noted that litigation was but one way they advanced
their constitutional agenda, and listed among the others, judicial nominations and "a number of
Justice Department publications." Id.
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review this background as well as recent doctrine at some length despite its familiarity
in certain circles. The Court's doctrine in this area is extremely complex and its
relative inaccessibility to a broader audience diminishes its political saliency in ways
harmful to both democratic values and the development of constitutional meaning.26
The significance of the Court's new direction generally is underappreciated, even
among "opinion elites" who shape public discourse, elected representatives whose
power is at stake, and most lawyers (the vast majority of whom studied constitutional
law when the Court interpreted congressional power expansively and with great
deference to Congress).2 7 A large gap thus exists between constitutional scholars and
almost everyone else with regard to the importance attributed to the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions.
Part III is the heart of this Article. Section A details the Reagan administration's
agenda for constitutional change particularly with regard to Congress's commerce
power, Congress's enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments, and
other issues of state sovereignty. Section B examines Reagan's use ofjudicial selection
to effect constitutional change, and especially a Department of Justice report that
expressly supported the use of legal ideology in selecting judges. Section C compares
the Reagan vision to the positions since adopted by the Rehnquist Court.
Part IV concludes with some lessons we should take from Reagan's success. I
consider the Rehnquist Court's treatment of congressional power in light of some
recent literature on democratic influences on constitutional change. The connections
between the Reagan revolution and what may be the Rehnquist Court's "revolution"
illustrate the ways in which judges, for example, represent popular understandings
about the Constitution. 28 Above all, Reagan's success points to the need for improved
26. Judge Noonan recently observed: "The results are incomprehensible without an
understanding of the legal doctrines on which they are based. The doctrines are abstract.
Abstractness gives them an appearance of depth they do not deserve." NOONAN, supra note 7, at
2. He also stated:
The results I criticize were reached largely, although not wholly, by means of the
doctrinal devices-state sovereign immunity, congruence and proportionality of
legislation, and a record of evils to be eradicated-that have no footing in the
constitution. Remove these obfuscations, it will be clear that the court's decisions
do not survive the test of serving constitutional purposes.
Id. at 12.
27. For example, when compared with the robust academic literature inspired by the
Rehnquist Court's treatment of congressional power, press coverage and commentary for a more
general audience has been sparse. Notable exceptions include federal judge John Noonan's
remarkable book, NOONAN, supra note 7; several speeches by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton,
in particular Separation Anxiety: The Intersection of Congress, the Courts, and the Constitution,
Address Before the Georgetown Law Center Chapter of the American Constitution Society
(Mar. 12, 2002), available at http://www.acslaw.org/hrctranscript.htm; and numerous articles by
Linda Greenhouse, who covers the Supreme Court for The New York Times, including: Battle on
Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at A18; 5-4, Now and Forever, supra note 9; At the
Court, Dissent Over States'Rights Is Now War, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 4, at 3; Supreme
Court: The Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at 1; The High
Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4, at 3.
28. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 22; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6. See generally H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND
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public understanding regarding constitutional change: understanding of the substantive
import of the Rehnquist Court's decisions, of Reagan's role in effecting the Court's
significant changes in the law of congressional power, and more generally, as the
Court moves toward judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation, of the
appropriate roles of nonjudicial actors and processes in the development of
constitutional meaning.29
1I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM PRIOR TO 1980
This Part describes the modem development of Congress's powers pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prior to the time
President Reagan took office and sought to promote his views of these powers. My aim
is two-fold. First, the judicial doctrines reviewed here were the target of the changes
advocated by Reagan and adopted by the Rehnquist Court, the subject of the next Part.
Second, the pre-Reagan evolution of the meaning of both of these important
constitutional sources of congressional power not only is relevant doctrinal
background, but also provides two of our Nation's strongest historical examples of
how the nonjudicial branches of the federal government actually have influenced the
development of constitutional meaning. They therefore prove helpful in evaluating the
extraordinary efforts of President Reagan to do the same.
A. Congress's Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce
Certainly one of the most widely known and dramatic instances in which a U.S.
President sought to fundamentally change the way in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the Constitution was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1937 proposal to
increase the number of Justices on the Court. Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan, as it is
popularly known, would have added to the Court an additional Justice for every Justice
over the age of seventy and would have allowed Roosevelt immediately to make six
new appointments. 30 The proposal resulted, in significant part, from a disagreement
between the President and the Court over the scope of congressional power and the
constraints of federalism-the same issues at the core of the Reagan administration's
plans to change the course of constitutional interpretation, and thus an apt focal point
for this review of Congress's commerce power.
Nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, of course, was a watershed year in constitutional
POLITICS (2002) (discussed infra notes 267-71, 275 and accompanying text).
29. Professor Larry Kramer recently wrote of the "paradox of constitutional democracy" and
"the indispensable insight of popular constitutionalism:" "Institutions immune or removed from
politics may be vital to secure principles that are prerequisites for democratic rule .... Yet
ultimately nothing can vouchsafe the rightness of what these institutions do, nothing can save
them from partiality and blindness, other than democratic challenge, scrutiny, and revision."
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (2001).
30. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 134 (1995). Roosevelt's proposal was not
unprecedented. Congress, for example, reduced the number of Justices to seven to prevent
President Andrew Johnson from making an appointment, and then expanded the number back to
nine after the election of President Ulysses S. Grant. See ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 239.
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history, and our understanding of the events of that time benefits from continuing
dynamic scholarship.31 President Roosevelt, fresh from a landslide reelection, enjoyed
strong public support for his New Deal policies but faced a hostile Supreme Court.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Court had interpreted various
constitutional provisions to preclude much of.the new governmental regulation of the
economy. Most relevant here is the pre-1937 Court's relatively narrow reading of
Congress's commerce power.
Among Congress's legislative powers enumerated in Article I is "the power... [t]o
regulate Commerce ... among the several States." 32 Over the centuries the Court has
varied in its interpretations of "commerce" and "among the several States," with
substantial implications for Congress's ability to legislate. A central and recurring
question throughout has been whether the Court should interpret the scope of
Congress's commerce power as limited by federalism concerns, including the Tenth
Amendment33 and a conception of state sovereignty not express in the text but inherent
in the constitutional structure. Early on, the Marshall Court in Gibbons v. Ogden
answered no. In that 1824 decision, the Court identified the political processes of
congressional action and elections (rather than judicially imposed limits) as the
appropriate check on Congress.
34
The Court of the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century, by contrast, imposed
substantial judicial limits on Congress's constitutional authority to legislate pursuant to
its commerce power. The Court invalidated unprecedented numbers of acts of
Congress-laws that, also for the first time, imposed substantial economic regulations
at a national level, including by prohibiting child labor and setting maximum hour and
minimum wage requirements for the purpose of advancing social justice. The Court,
citing the need to protect state sovereignty,3 created new doctrinal limits on the scope
31. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 22; BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 30; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Court, while noting that Congress's
power did not extend to commerce completely internal to a state that "does not extend to or
affect other states," id. at 194, defined Congress's power as otherwise plenary:
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution. . . .If, as has always been understood, the
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in single government....
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are... the sole restraints on
which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on
which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
Id. at 196-97.
35. In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the Court explained:
If it be held that [the commerce power] includes the regulation of all such
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of Congress's commerce power. Among them, the Court excluded from the
constitutional meaning of "commerce"-and thus found beyond Congress's power to
regulate-the manufacture, production, or mining of products. 6 The Court also found
that Congress could regulate certain transactions within a state if they had a "direct"
effect on interstate commerce, but not if the effects were "indirect.,
37
The Court relied on these distinctions to strike down federal laws even when
Congress was careful to regulate only those goods actually shipped in interstate
commerce. For example, the Court found that Congress lacked the power to prohibit
the interstate shipment of goods produced by children, because the regulation was
aimed at the use of child labor in production, not "commerce. 38 The Court
characteristically cited the need to avoid otherwise-dire consequences for state power:
[I]f Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition
of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce
will be at an end, and the power of the States over local matters may be eliminated,
and thus our system of government be practically destroyed.
39
And yet, while the Court cited state sovereignty to justify its invalidation of federal
laws, the Court also invalidated state laws that imposed the same types of economic
regulations on the grounds they violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
40(substantive) due process, and specifically, the liberty to contract.
manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the
future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries
that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be
invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries,
mining-in short, every branch of human industry. For is there one of them that
does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an interstate... market?... [T]he duty
would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform and vital
interests-interests which in their nature are and must be local ....
156 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1895).
36. E.g., id. (holding that the production of refined sugar was not commerce within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause).
37. E.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935). The
Court, though, was not entirely consistent in its imposition of judicial limits on the scope of
Congress's commerce power. See, e.g., Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S.
342 (1914) (upholding the regulation of intrastate rail rates because of their effect on interstate
commerce); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the 1895 Act for the
Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and Interstate Commerce and the Postal
Service, which prohibited the interstate transportation of lottery tickets).
38. Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The law prohibited
the transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced in companies in which children
under fourteen were employed or children between fourteen and sixteen were employed more
than eight hours a day or six days a week or between seven in the evening and six in the
morning.
39. Id. at 276.
40. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (holding
unconstitutional a state law that set a minimum wage for women); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a D.C. law that set a minimum wage for women);
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Illustrative of the Court's interpretation of the commerce power during this period
was its invalidation of two pieces of New Deal legislation during the two years before
Roosevelt announced his "Court-packing" plan. The Court in 1935, inA.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States (the "sick chicken" case), 4' struck down the Live
Poultry Code, designed pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act. The Code
regulated the sale of poultry and also the conditions of employment. Specifically, it
prohibited child labor, set maximum hours and a minimum wage, required collective
bargaining, and prohibited sellers from requiring buyers to purchase sick chickens
along with the rest of the coop of chickens. The Court relied on a distinction between
the "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce to hold the Code
unconstitutional; even though virtually all the chickens in question were shipped
interstate, the Court held these types of regulations of the sale and slaughter of
chickens while they physically were in one state did not have a sufficiently "direct"
effect on interstate commerce. The Court found this distinction necessary to protect
state sovereignty:
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the
federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the
authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of
the federal government.
42
The next year, the Court held that Congress also had exceeded its commerce power
in enacting the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.43 Under the law, local coal
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state law that set
maximum hours for bakery workers).
The Rehnquist Court similarly can be criticized for its selective attention to state sovereignty.
See, e.g., Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-
Related Cases on Its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TULSA L. REv. 305 (2001) (discussing preemption
cases in which the Court was quick to find state regulation of business preempted by federal
schemes); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 81-82
(2001) ("The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of states' rights as one might expect if it
were operating primarily from a federalism perspective."); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (discussing
numerous inconsistencies in what is described as the Court's "categorical federalism" approach).
It is, though, beyond the scope of this Article to seek a coherent explanation for the
jurisprudence of either the pre- 1937 Court, but see sources cited supra note 31, or the Rehnquist
Court, but see Colker & Brudney, supra, at 81-87 (suggesting the Court's disrespect for
Congress better explains its decisions than respect for state sovereignty); John 0. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90
CAL. L. REv. 485,489 (2002) ("IT]he Rehnquist Court'sjurisprudence is one of decentralization
and private ordering of social norms."); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntiDiscrimination Agenda,
111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142 (2002) (suggesting the "unifying thread behind the Court's innovative
constitutional case law" is "an anti-antidiscrimination agenda").
41. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42. Id. at 546.
43. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1 (1936) (holding Congress had exceeded its spending power in enacting the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933).
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boards, after collective bargaining, would set prices for coal and minimum wages and
maximum hours for employees. The Court held that Congress lacked the power to
regulate the conditions of employment for those who mined the coal, even though the
coal would be sold interstate; Congress could regulate only commerce, which the
Court held meant trade, not production. Again, the Court saw its role as encompassing
the identification and enforcement of limits on Congress's commerce power in order to
protect spheres of state sovereignty:
Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step; and the danger of such
a step by the federal government in the direction of taking over the powers of the
states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of their powers
... as to reduce them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national
domain.
4
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Barry Friedman, writing separately, have provided
insightful accounts of the period. Of particular interest here are the reactions of the
President, Congress, and the general public to the pre-1937 Court's limited reading of
congressional power, and then to Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and other proposals
to deal with what was widely viewed as the problem of the Court.45 With the country
then still struggling with years of devastating economic depression, the Court's
invalidation of New Deal efforts to improve the economy met strong public opposition.
At the end of 1935, "newspaper editors voted the debate about judicial review and the
Court's encounter with the New Deal the year's 'biggest' news story."" Roosevelt
thus made his proposal to increase the size of the Court at a time of widespread
dissatisfaction with the Court's constitutional interpretations. The political and public
response at that time contrasts sharply with the relative lack of attention to the
Rehnquist Court's admittedly less-momentous shifts in the same direction.
President Roosevelt's personal leadership in responding to the Court's decisions
undoubtedly contributed greatly to the high degree of popular understanding.
Roosevelt, certainly more than most Presidents, pressed his own views about how the
Constitution should be interpreted and believed his role as President included
participation in the development of constitutional meaning. 47 In his first State of the
Union address, he said, "[Mjeans must be found to adapt our legal forms and our
judicial interpretation to the actual present national needs of the largest progressive
democracy in the modem world., 48 He reportedly said that when he took the
presidential oath of office and swore to uphold the Constitution, "I felt like saying,
44. Carter, 298 US. at 295-96.
45. See ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 279-344; Friedman, supra note 31.
46. Friedman, supra note 31, at 993 (quoting Biggest News Rose in Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1935, at 19).
47. President Roosevelt demonstrated a strong interest in presidential autonomy in
constitutional interpretation in other areas as well. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 31, at 1032-34
(discussing Roosevelt's views on judicial supremacy and planned reaction in the event of a
negative decision in the Gold Standard cases); Robert H. Jackson, A PresidentialLegal Opinion,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1357-58 (1953) (memorializing Roosevelt's personal view that a
legislative veto provision in the Lend Lease Act was unconstitutional).
48. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1019 (citing Turner Catledge, Basic Law Upheld, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1937, at 1 (quoting Roosevelt)).
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'Yes, but it's the Constitution as I understand it, flexible enough to meet any new
problems of democracy-not the kind of Constitution your Court has raised up as a
barrier to progress and democracy."'
49
Roosevelt responded to the Court's 1935 Schecter Poultry decision with a
presidential press conference that Professor Ackerman describes as a remarkable
instance of "a President actually engaged in genuine constitutional thought."50
Roosevelt spoke for an hour and a half, offering his own views on a decision "more
important than any decision probably since the Dred Scott case." 51 He identified the
key issue as follows:
Is the United States going to decide, are the people of this country going to decide
that their Federal Government shall in the future have no right under any implied
power or any court-approved power to enter a national economic problem, but that
that economic problem must be decided only by the states?
5 2
Roosevelt's proposal was only one of many proposals aimed at altering the Court's
constitutional interpretations.53 Leading Senate alternatives included proposals to
amend the Constitution to limit the Court's power to review the constitutionality of
federal statutes: one version would have required a two-thirds vote of the Supreme
Court for invalidation, and another would have allowed Congress by a two-thirds vote,
after an intervening election, to override a judicial invalidation.54 The very public
debate over the merits of these proposals-as well as the Court's ultimate response-
provides an extraordinary instance of dialogue among the President, Congress, the
Court and the American public over constitutional meaning.
Congress, of course, ultimately neither expanded the Court nor amended the
Constitution.55 Instead, after vociferous debate and opposition even among some New
49. Id. (citing LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT 33 (1967)).
50. ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 298. "The most striking feature of Roosevelt's presentation
was its high constitutional seriousness." Id. at 297.
5 1. Id. at 297 (quoting Roosevelt, 5 Complete Presidential Press Conferences 315 (May 3 1,
1935)).
52. Id.
53. "'The years 1935-1937 ... saw more 'Court-curbing' bills introduced in Congress than in
any other three-year (or thirty.five-year) period in history."' LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 30, at
102 (quoting Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-packing
Episode of 1937, 103 POL. Sc. Q. 267, 273 (1988) (quoting Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing
Periods in American History,18 VAND. L. REv. 925, 926 (1965))); see also Friedman, supra
note 31, at 994-95.
54. ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 332; see also Id. at 316 (thirty-nine constitutional
amendments were submitted during the congressional term before the 1936 election); Friedman,
supra note 3 1, at 994-95 (discussing record number of Court-curbing proposals during 1935-37).
55. Despite initial strong opposition to Roosevelt's proposal even among some New Deal
supporters and critics of the Court, a compromise version might well have passed had it not been
for the death of Roosevelt's chief congressional supporter, Senate Majority Leader Joe
Robinson. ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 335-37; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 30, at 149-54;
Friedman, supra note 31, at 1029-30.
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Deal supporters, the proposal was rendered far less necessary by what is popularly
known as "the switch in time that saved nine." The Court issued several five-to-four
decisions in 1937 that upheld legislation of the type the Court previously had
invalidated, 6 and the Court began radically changing its interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions (especially the Due Process
Clause) critical to the constitutionality of New Deal-era legislation.57
The Court's decisions over the next five years repudiated virtually all of the limits
the Court itself previously had imposed on what it now described as Congress's
"plenary" Commerce Clause authority.58 Specifically, the Court rejected its narrow
definition of commerce that had excluded the manufacture and production of goods, 59
and expressly overruled its decision denying Congress the power to prohibit the
interstate sale of goods made with child labor.6° The Court also abandoned its prior
distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce, a distinction the
Court never had articulated clearly or applied consistently. More generally, the Court
declared that it no longer would interpret the Tenth Amendment to limit the scope of
Congress's power, and to invalidate laws otherwise within a Congress's enumerated
powers: "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.'
For more than half a century-from 1937 until 1995-the Court followed this
broad, deferential interpretation of Congress's commerce power and routinely upheld
federal statutes against charges that Congress had exceeded its power. 2 The broadest
definition of Congress's commerce power came in the Court's 1942 decision in
Wickard v. Filburn, which upheld Congress's power to limit a farmer's production of
wheat for home consumption because of the possible cumulative effect that all farmers'
home consumption of wheat would have on the interstate market for wheat.63 Under
Wickard, Congress could regulate particular instances of activity that occurred wholly
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding on basis
of commerce power); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding on basis of
due process).
57. "From 1937 on, the relationship among the branches of government shifted dramatically,
as an era of 'judicial supremacy' gave way to deference by the Supreme Court to Congress."
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 30, at 219.
58. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37. Ackerman characterized the resulting
"paradigm shift" as "a constitutional change of the most fundamental kind" and quoted Robert
Jackson's description that the change "signifies the disintegration of '[tihe older world of
laissez-faire."' ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 401 (emphasis in original).
59. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 38-41.
60. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
61. Id. at 124.
62. The Court found that Congress had exceeded its commerce power in only two cases
between 1937 and 1995, and the Court subsequently overruled one of the two cases. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). These
decisions did not limit the general scope of Congress's commerce power, but instead imposed
special limits on how Congress could exercise the power as applied to the states. See infra notes
167-80, 220-29 and accompanying text.
63. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
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within one state and with only trivial interstate effect, based on Congress's assessment
of the cumulative effect of all instances of that activity across the country. 64 During
those decades, Congress relied, at least in part, on its commerce power to enact a broad
array of laws generally accepted today as appropriately the subject of federal
legislation. This includes the kinds of economic and social welfare laws the Court
invalidated prior to 1937, such as minimum wage, maximum hour, collective
bargaining, and child labor laws, as well as major civil rights, environmental, and
criminal laws. For example, in 1971, the Court in Perez v. United States upheld
Congress's authority to impose criminal penalties for purely intrastate extortionate
credit transactions.65 Most notably, the Court unanimously upheld Congress's power to
enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act's ban on discrimination in places of public
accommodation, because of the cumulative effect of discrimination by restaurants and
hotels on interstate commerce, including interstate travel.66
B. Congress's Authority to Enforce the Reconstruction Amendments
The modem development of Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments also showcases nonjudicial actors as
important participants in the development of constitutional meaning. Here, Congress
provided a particularly strong voice. Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel
insightfully describe how, in the aftermath of Brown v. Board ofEducation,67 Congress
engaged in a kind of public debate with the Court about how to interpret the open-
ended guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments. 68 And to a significant extent the
Court "invited Congress's participation in vindicating equality norms" during the
64. The Court explained:
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective
execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
65.402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may
in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce.").
66. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964). Justices Douglas and Goldberg concurred on the grounds that Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress with the power to enact the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 292 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
67. 397 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). Of course, civil rights
organizations and, more broadly, social movements also contributed greatly to the development
of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(1975); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (discussing the role of social movements-and
especially the American feminist movement-in constitutional change).
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period after the Court's decision in Brown and prior to the Rehnquist Court.69
All three Reconstruction Amendments adopted after the Civil War-the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments---expressly empower Congress to enact
legislation. They each declare, using very similar language, that Congress shall have
the power to enforce the guarantees of the Amendments through appropriate
legislation.70 Most often at issue has been Congress's authority pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce Section l's guarantee that no state shall deny
any person the equal protection of the laws. A recurring set of interpretive issues
concerns the scope of Congress's Section 5 enforcement authority. For example, may
Congress enact legislation premised on a view of the substantive meaning of the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment that is more protective of individual rights
than the Court's interpretations, adopted in the course ofjudicial enforcement of those
provisions? A related question: apart from any authority to define the scope of
protected rights, how broad is Congress's power to enforce judicially recognized rights
through legislative protections that go beyond what the courts would order as judicial
remedies (that is, how far may Congress go to remedy or prevent what the Court would
agree are constitutional violations)?
On relatively rare but significant occasion, Congress has legislated based on a
constitutional interpretation in direct conflict with the Court's declared view, as the
New Deal Congress did with ultimate success. Congress's claim to some measure of
interpretive independence regarding the Reconstruction Amendments gains added
strength from the constitutional text's conferral on Congress of "enforcement"
authority-indeed, Congress is the only entity textually charged with enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments. During the 1960s and 1970s, as the Court struggled to
define the contours of the substantive guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments,
Congress enacted civil rights legislation premised on interpretations more protective of
rights than the Court's, or before the Court had adopted any view.7' Such laws include:
69. Post & Siegel, supra note 68, at 446.
70. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude and, in Section 2
provides "Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains many substantive guarantees, including
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
id. amend. XIV, § 1, and Section 5 provides, "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, id. amend. XV, § 1, and in Section 2 provides, "The Congress shall have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. amend. XV, § 2.
71. The Court's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson considered Congress's
legislative treatment of sex discrimination relevant to the level of protection the Court should
afford women pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an
increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor
union, or other organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate
against any individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer... "shall
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the Equal Pay Act of 1963,72 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,73 the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 74 the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 75 and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978.76
The ways in which the Rehnquist Court's recent cases have narrowed Congress's
powers under the Reconstruction Amendments are less immediately apparent and more
complex than its changes in Commerce Clause doctrine, though the implications are at
least as profound. First, as Professors Post and Siegel's compelling account
demonstrates, the Court's Section 5 precedent alone does not fully convey the extent of
the Court's reliance on Congress to help define the meaning of the guarantee of equal
protection. Congress assisted the Court both by helping to secure public support of
then-controversial constitutional interpretations and also by translating the public's
view of what equal protection required." Yet when the Court upheld landmark civil
rights legislation, it relied instead on Congress's commerce power,78 thereby obviating
discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex." And § 1 of the Equal
Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the
legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that "[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based
upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration.
411 U.S. 677,687-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted); see also Post&
Siegel, supra note 68, at 520 (discussing Frontiero).
72. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206d (2000)).
73. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (2000)).
74. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)).
75. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
76. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)).
77. Post & Siegel, supra note 68, at 446 ("[T]he representative branches of government were
an important resource for the Court as it struggled to learn from and speak to the American
people about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of 'equal protection of the
laws.').
78. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an exercise of both its commerce power
and its Section 5 authority, but a majority of Justices on the Court upheld the law on the basis of
the commerce power alone, reserving the Section 5 issue:
Congress possessed ample power in this regard, and we have therefore not
considered the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining
authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not
pass, but merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here
we have considered it alone.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). The Court achieved
unanimity in upholding the statute with two Justices (Douglas and Goldberg) concurring on the
grounds that they believed Section 5 provided the more appropriate source of authority. Id. at
279 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 292 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Post and Siegel write:
[A]lthough the Court was cautious about attributing Congress's power to prohibit
discrimination by private actors to Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment... it was not in the least ambivalent about the larger point, which
was that Congress had authority to enact legislation applying antidiscrimination
norms to transactions between private parties.
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the need to define the extent of Congress's Section 5 authority (and, more salient to the
Court at the time, to reconsider the state action requirement of the Civil Rights Cases
of 1883). 7 9 Only since 1995 has the Rehnquist Court's expansion of sovereign
immunity and new limits on Congress's commerce power required the Court to
consider Section 5 separately as a source of authority for civil rights legislation. 0
Moreover, for Congress to act on a constitutional view that differs from the Court's
view may threaten (or at least seem to threaten) judicial power, and the Justices (even
those who support expansive interpretations of congressional power) may have a
tendency to overprotect the Court's institutional prerogatives. Finally, a related point:
the pre-Rehnquist Court's Section 5 doctrine was not as uniform and coherent as was
its Commerce Clause doctrine, hence the doctrinal changes appear less extreme.
Even with these qualifications, at the time Reagan took office, the Court's view of
Section 5 authority was substantially broader than the current Court's view and at least
seemed to allow Congress to define the scope of rights more expansively than the
Court's interpretations. Most significant is the Court's 1966 decision in Katzenbach v.
Morgan upholding section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.8, Section 4(e)
prohibited the states from using an English literacy test to deny the right to vote to
anyone who had completed the sixth grade in a school in Puerto Rico where the
instruction was in Spanish.8 2 Congress sought in particular to override a New York
statute that disenfranchised Puerto Ricans who were literate in Spanish but not
English.8 3 The Court several years earlier had held in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections that the use of an English literacy test as a requirement for voting
did not violate Section l's guarantee of equal protection. 4 Relying on Lassiter, the
State of New York argued in Katzenbach that Congress's Section 5 authority to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the power to determine,
independent of the Court, the scope of the Amendment's substantive guarantees, and in
effect overrule the Supreme Court.8 5 Under this view, because the Court had
determined that the use of literacy tests did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress could not prohibit their use.
The Katzenbach Court upheld section 4(e) and rejected New York's argument,
which the Court said "would confine the legislative power.., to the insignificant role
of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge
unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of the Amendment's substantive
Post & Siegel, supra note 68, at 494-95.
79. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In this and other early cases, the Court was quite hostile to Congress's
authority to enforce the recently ratified Reconstruction Amendments.
80. Under the Court's rulings since 1996, Congress now may abrogate states' sovereign
immunity, and therefore make available meaningful remedies through private suits for damages,
only when it legislates pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments (and not pursuant to its
Article I powers, including its commerce power). Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(in federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (in state court).
81. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
82. See id. at 643 n. I (quoting section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
83. Id. at 645 n.3.
84. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
85. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648.
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guarantees.8 6 The Court instead endorsed a broad view of Congress's enforcement
authority along two distinct lines. First, using a very deferential standard of review, the
Court held that Congress reasonably could have decided to remove this obstacle to
voting as a measure to remedy other forms of discrimination the Court would find
unconstitutional-in particular, to give Puerto Ricans in New York enhanced political
power as an aid to obtaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services, such as
housing and education.8 7 Even more broadly, the Court also found that Congress
possessed "a specially informed legislative competence" and could have determined
that, in the circumstances addressed by section 4(e), New York's literacy requirement
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Justice Harlan, writing for two Justices in dissent, described the majority's approach
as giving Congress "the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment,"
which was a judicial question for the Court, not Congress, to decide.8 9 The dissent also
raised the concern that, were it otherwise, just as Congress could recognize new rights,
it could violate rights recognized by the Court by enacting laws premised on a less
expansive view of equal protection or due process.9° The majority responded that
Congress's Section 5 authority to "enforce" does not include the authority "to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute" constitutional guarantees. 9' The majority's approach is commonly
described as a "one-way ratchet" under which Congress may enforce the Amendment
in ways that are more, but not less, protective of rights.
The Court similarly has upheld laws against challenges that they exceeded
Congress's enforcement authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 92 by
seeking to redefine, rather than enforce, protected rights. In 1980, in City of Rome v.
86. Id. at 648-49.
87. Id. at 652.
88. Id. at 655-56.
Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might
predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy
requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in
Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than English
constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 655.
89. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
90. "In all such cases there is room for reasonable men to differ as to whether or not a denial
of equal protection or due process has occurred, and the final decision is one ofjudgment. Until
today this judgment has always been one for the judiciary to resolve." Id. (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). On the alternative grounds for the majority's conclusion, the dissent conceded that
Congress's determinations about relevant "legislative facts," such as the extent of discrimination,
were "entitled to due respect" and that even absent such determinations, a simple "legislative
announcement" that a state law violated the guarantee of equal protection "is of course entitled
to the most respectful consideration, coming as it does from a concurrent branch and one that is
knowledgeable in matters of popular political participation." Id. at 668-70 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
91.Id. at 651 n.10.
92. "[T]he nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments has always been treated as coextensive." City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 207 n.I (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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United States, the Court upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
prohibited certain voting practices that had a discriminatory racial impact. 93 The Court
held that, even on the assumption that only purposeful discrimination violated the
Fifteenth Amendment, "Congress could rationally have concluded that ... it was
proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact." 94 Then-Justice
Rehnquist dissented and described the law as a congressional usurpation of judicial
power, 95 grounds similar to those the current Court cites in support of its new
limitations on congressional power.
The Court's 1970 ruling in Oregon v. Mitchell, though, did suggest some limits on
Congress's power. On the one hand, the Court unanimously upheld a nationwide five-
year suspension of the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite for voting, 96 again despite
the Court's ruling that literacy tests were not unconstitutional on their face. 97 And yet,
by a vote of five-to-four, the Court found that Congress had exceeded its enforcement
authority in requiring states to allow anyone eighteen or older to vote in state or local
elections, though Congress did have the power to mandate this age for federal
elections.9" The Court lacked a majority rationale for this holding, which was "the only
authoritative Supreme Court case from 1937 to 1987 to hold an act of Congress
unconstitutional based on a lack of enumerated power." 99
Finally, in what has been described as perhaps the Court's "most expansive
recognition of congressional Reconstruction power,"' l° the Court in 1968 broadly
construed Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.' 0' The Court
upheld a statute, enacted in its original form in 1866, that prohibited "all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property. 10 2 In
enacting this statute, Congress prohibited forms of racial discrimination that the Court
would not itself find violative of Section l's prohibition on slavery and involuntary
93. Id. at 177.
94. Id. (footnote omitted) ("Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral
changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in
voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a
discriminatory impact.").
95. "Neither reason nor precedent supports the conclusion that here it is 'appropriate' for
Congress to attempt to prevent purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which a locality
proves is not purposeful discrimination." Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
Thus, the result of the Court's holding is that Congress effectively has the power to
determine for itself that this conduct violates the Constitution. This result violates
previously well-established distinctions between the Judicial Branch and the
Legislative or Executive Branches of the Federal Government. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803).
Id. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
97. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
98.Id. at 118.
99. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 511 (4th ed. 2000).
100. Id. at 503.
101. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
102. Id. at 413 (emphasis in original).
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servitude. 10 3 The Court nevertheless held that Section 2, which uses language almost
identical to the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
confers on Congress the power "rationally to determine what are the badges and
incidents of slavery."' 4
The Court's opinions offered only minimal analysis of why and when Congress
could enforce the Reconstruction Amendments to provide greater protection of rights
than the Court would provide in the absence of legislation. But the Court's willingness
to defer to Congress's enforcement efforts inspired a rich academic literature. In one
notable early article, Professor Lawrence Sager supported an active role for Congress
in both the interpretation and enforcement of the substantive guarantees of the
Reconstruction Amendments.10 5 Sager premised his theory on a recognition that the
federal judiciary sometimes declines to uphold constitutionally based claims, not
because of its reading of the relevant constitutional provision, but because of
"'institutional' concerns such as judicial competence and federalism."'0 6 When the
Court exercises restraint due to institutional concerns, the by-product is what Sager
terms "'underenforced' constitutional norms," norms that remain legally valid and
enforceable by Congress despite judicial nonenforcement. 0 7 Congress still is bound by
such norms up to their conceptual limits, and must take an active role in determining
the parameters of those limits. 108 Congress thus is empowered, when necessary fully to
enforce constitutional norms, to prohibit state activity that the Court would not itself
find unconstitutional.'9
Il. THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
Thus, when Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the Court interpreted congressional
power as subject to few judicial constraints in the interest of state sovereignty. Just as
President Roosevelt had publicly challenged the Court's narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause in the years before 1937, so too President Reagan strongly and
openly opposed the Court's then-broad and deferential view of congressional power.
Moreover, both President Roosevelt and Congress had established that the political
branches could effectively contribute to the development of constitutional meaning.
A hallmark of Reagan's presidency was his commitment to transforming the role of
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
104. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440; see Akhil Reed Amar,Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 748,
822 (1999) ("These words [of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment] are inpari materia with
the words of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A very powerful intratextual presumption
arises that these two parallel clauses must be interpreted in parallel fashion.").
105. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
106. Id. at 1212.
107. Id. at 1213.
108. See id. at 1227.
109. See id. at 1235. According to Sager, Congress's authority to act in this manner extends
only to instances where the Court has declined to enforce a norm due to "institutional"
constraints. If the Court has rendered an "analytical"judgment-that is, one based on a reading
of the substantive limits of the constitutional provision at issue-then Congress must view that
judgment as establishing the legal limits of such provision. See id. at 1217-18, 1241.
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government in the United States: to reduce the size and influence of the federal
government, to return significant power to the states, and to reverse the so-called
"activism" of the federal courts. In his First Inaugural Address, President Reagan
declared:
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to
demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal
Government and those reserved to the States or the people. All of us need to be
reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created
the Federal Government. 
10
Indicative of the depth of his commitment and willingness to use the powers of the
presidency to further his vision of federalism, President Reagan in October of 1987
issued an executive order that set forth federalism principles to guide every action of
the executive branch."'
This much about the Reagan presidency is generally known. Indeed, at the heart of
our national understanding of Reagan's legacy lies his significant success in changing
at least public discourse about the role of government. Although Reagan was not
successful in actually reducing the size of the national government, 1"2 elected officials
from both political parties continue to be influenced by Reagan's rhetoric about
federalism and the role of government. President Bill Clinton provided one strong
indication of Reagan's success in this regard when in his 1996 State of the Union
address he declared "the era of big government is over," in connection with his support
for policies such as sweeping reform (including reduction) of public welfare
programs." 1
3
110. President Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981). Reagan
similarly told the National Conference of State Legislatures that a goal of his administration was
"to restore the constitutional symmetry between the central Government and the States and...
reestablish the freedom and variety of federalism." President Ronald Reagan, Remarks in
Atlanta, Georgia, at the Annual Convention of the National Conference of State Legislatures,
PUB. PAPERS 679, 683 (July 30, 198 1). "This Nation has never fully debated the fact that over
the past 40 years, federalism-one of the underlying principles of our Constitution-has nearly
disappeared as a guiding force in American politics and government." Id. Reagan announced that
he "intends to initiate such a debate." Id. See generally FRIED, supra note 18, at 50-52, 186-88,
198 (discussing the strong role of federalism concerns in the Reagan administration); DOUGLAS
W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 17-46,
132-51 (1992) (same).
S111. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987) [hereinafter Reagan Exec. Order],
repealed by Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000)
[hereinafter Clinton Exec. Order].
112. Martin Tolchin, Paradox of Reagan Budgets: Austere Talk vs. Record Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1988, at Al (federal civilian work force grew under Reagan, and federal
government created more new debt than under all previous Presidents combined).
113. When President Clinton's statement is viewed in context, though, it is clear that his
vision of government differed significantly from President Reagan's.
The era of big government is over. But we cannot go back to the time when our
citizens were left to fend for themselves. Instead, we must go forward as one
America .... I believe our new, smaller Government must work in an
old-fashioned American way, together with all of our citizens through State and
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Less widely appreciated is the extraordinary extent to which Reagan sought not
only to advance his vision of government through policy choices and political
discourse, but also to enshrine it in constitutional doctrine. In the Reagan
administration's view, not only should Congress and the President choose policies and
approaches that favor state over federal control, in many instances the Constitution
should be reinterpreted to prohibit the federal government from acting. Congress and
the President should consider themselves constitutionally bound by narrow views of
federal power, and the courts should aggressively strike down as unconstitutional
federal action that intrudes on state sovereignty, as broadly redefined by the Reagan
administration.
President Reagan's federalism executive order contained suggestions that his
administration believed its federalism priorities were at least in part constitutionally
mandated. Among the directives: "Federal action limiting the policymaking discretion
of the States should be taken only where [among other things] constitutional authority
for the action is clear and certain,"'" 4 and "[c]onstitutional authority for Federal action
is clear and certain only when authority for the action may be found in a specific
provision of the Constitution, there is no provision in the Constitution prohibiting
Federal action, and the action does not encroach upon authority reserved to the
States.''15 The order left unanswered critical questions about how the applicable
provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted, though the use of "clear and
certain" signaled a narrow view of federal power.'16
The Reagan administration provided clear direction to executive branch officers
concerning how to read constitutional provisions relevant to federal power-as well as
on many other legal issues-in a series of reports issued by the Department of
local governments, in the workplace, in religious, charitable and civic associations.
Our goal must be to enable all our people to make the most of their own lives, with
stronger families, more educational opportunity, economic security, safer streets, a
cleaner environment in a safer world.
President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
114. Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 111, § 3(b).
115. Id. §3(b)2. The order also provided: "In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory
authority, the presumption of sovereignty should rest with the individual States. Uncertainties
regarding the legitimate authority of the national government should be resolved against
regulation at the national level." Id. §2(i).
116. President Clinton replaced President Reagan's federalism executive order with one of
his own. Clinton actually issued two executive orders; he replaced the first, Executive Order No.
13,083, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1998), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), after it met resistance from
state and local officials. See Jennie Holman Blake, Note, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State
Might? A Modern Debate Over Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REv.
293, 294. Professor John 0. McGinnis concluded that President Clinton's final federalism
executive order "does not differ substantially from President Reagan's" version. John 0.
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901,923 (2001); see
also id. at 929 n. 135. Clinton's order, however, made at least two significant, if subtle changes:
it dropped the "clear and certain" constitutional authority standard for federal action from
section 3(b) and removed the presumption of state sovereignty from section l(i). Compare
Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 111, with Clinton Exec. Order, supra note 111. See also Blake,
supra, app. B at 353.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Justice. l"7 These reports, which were little noticed at the time and remain little
examined, are extraordinary in several respects. First, their express independence from
then-prevailing Supreme Court doctrine is striking. In effect, they constituted
blueprints for what the Reagan administration believed the law should look like, as
well as how the administration could go about changing the law. In addition, they are
comprehensive in scope, detailing the administration's official positions on the most
important legal issues of the day-issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and the
rights of criminal defendants-and prominently featuring congressional power and
state sovereignty among the issues targeted for change. Finally, the reports are
remarkable for their success, particularly on issues of federalism, when measured
against the Rehnquist Court's recent decisions.
President Reagan, of course, did not succeed as quickly and completely as had
President Roosevelt. The state of Supreme Court doctrine regarding congressional
power and state sovereignty when President Reagan left office in 1989 was not much
changed. Indeed, from Reagan's perspective, the most significant change was for the
worse: the Court's 1985 decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,' 18 which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery 119 and disavowed
judicially imposed safeguards for state sovereignty. 20 It was not until 1995 that the
Court began significantly limiting the scope of Congress's powers to legislate and
expanding the scope of state sovereignty along the lines Reagan had advocated.
Notwithstanding that delay, President Reagan's success in promoting his constitutional
views has proven substantial, and may continue. I now will examine in greater detail
Reagan's vision for transforming the law of federalism and congressional power, his
use of judicial appointments to promote that vision, and the extent of his success.
117. The Reagan administration further evidenced its constitutional views on federalism in a
November 1986 inter-agency working group report:
The nationalization of state sovereignty can be traced in large part to the way the
Supreme Court and the Congress have applied and interpreted the Constitution
.... Congress, through grasping extensions of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the Commerce Clause, and the spending power, has increased the size and
extended the reach of the national government far beyond the scope of the national
powers enumerated and fairly implied in the Constitution. The Supreme Court,
however, through the power of constitutional interpretation, has been the dominant
force in the decline of federalism, either by ratifying actions taken by the political
branches of government or interpreting (in truth, amending) the Constitution so as
to place limitations on the States not expressed in the Constitution itself.
THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, A REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 2 (1986) [hereinafter Working Group on Federalism].
Although, unlike the Guidelines, the working group report was not, and did not purport to be, an
official statement of the administration's positions, it was highly influential and resulted in,
among other things, President Reagan's issuance of the federalism executive order.
118.469 U.S. 528 (1985).
119. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
120. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
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A. The Reagan Administration's Agenda for Constitutional Change
On issues of nonjudicial interpretation, President Reagan should be placed in
history with the handful of past Presidents most renowned for promoting constitutional
views independent from, and in conflict with, those of the courts: Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.121 Most prominently,
Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese III, who served from 1985 to 1988, sparked
considerable controversy when in several speeches he advocated a strong presidential
role in shaping constitutional meaning.
Attorney General Meese espoused many controversial positions concerning how the
Constitution should be interpreted, including endorsement of a "Jurisprudence of
Original Intention" to guide constitutional interpretation. 122 Meese also aroused
concern with his views regarding who should interpret the Constitution. In a 1986
speech at Tulane Law School, Meese spoke of the distinction between the
Constitution, "the instrument by which the consent of the governed.., is transformed
into a government,"'' 23 and constitutional law, "what the Supreme Court says about the
Constitution in its decisions resolving the cases and controversies that come before
it."' 24 He criticized the Court for denying this distinction in dictum in Cooper v. Aaron
that characterized the Court's decisions as themselves "the supreme law of the land."'
' 25
Citing Abraham Lincoln's opposition to the DredScott decision, Meese explained that
what follows from this distinction is that the Court is not the only interpreter of the
Constitution. Officials in each of the three coordinate branches of government take an
121. Many have written about the positions of Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln on
presidential interpretative autonomy. See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 99, at 51-55, 211-13,
222-25; WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETATIVE AUTHORITY
41-44, 47-50, 71-73, 77-78 (Federalist Society ed., 1992); Kramer, supra note 29; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 85-103 (1993).
122. In one particularly extreme application; Meese criticized the doctrine of incorporation.
Citing a 1925 Supreme Court decision that made the guarantees of the First Amendment
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), Meese stated, "nowhere else has the principle of federalism been dealt so politically
violent and constitutionally suspect a blow as by the theory of incorporation." Speech Before the
American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 1,8 (Federalist Society ed., 1986) [hereinafter Speech Before the ABA]. Several
months later, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that "no Justice who has sat on the Supreme Court
during the past sixty years has questioned the proposition that the prohibitions against state
action that are incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment include the prohibitions against
federal action that are found in the First Amendment." Speech Before the Federal Bar
Association (Oct. 23, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra, 27, 28. Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. said of those who adhere only to "what they call 'the intentions of the Framers:' [I]n truth it is
little more than arrogance cloaked as humility." Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University (Oct. 21, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra, 11, 14.
123. Edwin Meese II, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 981 (1987).
124. Id. at 982.
125. Id. at 987 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)). Meese noted in a footnote
in the published version of his speech that his criticism was aimed at the dictum in Cooper, and
not its holding, with which he agreed.
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oath to uphold the Constitution and must interpret it.'2 6 Meese clearly had in mind
interpretations by the President and Congress that were independent of and even
contrary to the Court's decisions. He conceded that a constitutional decision of the
Court is binding on the parties in a case "and also the executive branch for whatever
enforcement is necessary." 127 He then continued, "[b]ut such a decision does not
establish a supreme law of the land that is binding on all persons and parts of
government henceforth and forevermore."' 28 Meese cited, in addition to Dred Scott
and Plessy v. Ferguson, what he viewed as unfair criticism of a judicial nominee for
his vote as a state legislator to require the posting of the Ten Commandments in the
public schools, despite a Supreme Court decision declaring a similar law
unconstitutional. 1
29
Meese's Tulane speech received considerable public attention, and also sparked
academic debate over nonjudicial constitutional interpretation.' 30 The public reaction
was mixed: many accused Meese of threatening the rule of law and inviting chaos,1
3
'
but Meese's views were defended even by some who typically disagreed with him,
132
and some expressions of concern seemed prompted, not only (or even primarily) by the
content of his speech, but by the speaker's identity and his other actions and views.
33
126. "The Supreme Court, then, is not the only interpreter of the Constitution. Each of the
three coordinate branches of government created and empowered by the Constitution-the
executive and legislative no less than the judicial-has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the
performance of its official functions." Id. at 985-86; see also Speech before the ABA, supra note
122, at 9 ("A constitution that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, is no longer a
constitution in the true sense.").
127. Meese, supra note 123, at 983.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 988.
130. See, e.g., Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court
Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Symposium, The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival
of Classical Jurisprudence, Panel IV. The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988).
131. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071
(1987) (citing various responses); Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 27, 1986,
at A23; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Liberties Union Denounces Meese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, at
A17; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Meese Says Rulings By U.S. High Court Don't Establish Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1986, at A 1. But see Editorial, The Irrepressible Mr. Meese, WALL ST. J., Oct.
29, 1986, at 28 (strongly defending the speech).
132. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 131, at 1075 ("As Lloyd Cutler, who was Jimmy
Carter's White House counsel, noted, there was little in the speech with which Homer
Cummings, F.D.R.'s Attorney General prior to the 1937 'revolution' in the Court, would have
disagreed .. "); id. at 1078 ("Just as a stopped clock is right twice a day, so Attorney General
Meese can be a source of insight."); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, The Supreme Law of the
Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1987) ("[Fjor
virtually all of the subjects it addressed, the speech was obviously correct, and for the rest, it was
probably right.").
133. For example, the Reagan/Meese Department of Justice controversially had refused to
comply with provisions of a federal statute-the Competition in Contracting Act-that it
deemed unconstitutional. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 14-15 (2000). See
generally id. (discussing appropriate presidential responses to constitutionally suspect statutes).
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The Washington Post, for example, entitled an editorial Why Give That Speech? and
wrote that it was "the subtle, unspoken message it sent to listeners, that gives rise to
legitimate concern and anger."'' 34 The public outcry led Meese several weeks later to
issue what he called a clarification of his views, entitled What I Meant, but which
actually in some respects constituted a backing down and change in views. 35 He stated
there, for example, that Supreme Court decisions have "general applicability" and "are
entitled to very high respect and consideration" by the other branches of government,
and that it would be "highly irresponsible" for federal and state officials "not to
conform their behavior to precedent."'
' 36
Meanwhile, largely unnoticed, lawyers at the Department of Justice were at work
developing, consistent with Meese's call for interpretative independence in his initial
Tulane speech, a set of comprehensive administration positions on a wide range of
legal issues, many of which were at odds with Supreme Court doctrine. The Office of
Legal Policy led this effort to develop an alternative vision of the law. "OLP," as it
was known, "function[ed] as a policy development staff for the Department and
undert[ook] comprehensive analyses of contemporary legal issues."
137
While Meese served as Attorney General, OLP issued a series of reports that
described and critiqued the state of the law in particular areas, offered the Reagan
administration's views of the correct legal interpretations, and developed strategies for
moving the law in the desired direction. These reports averaged well over one hundred
pages each, and titles included: Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook
(1987); Redefining Discrimination: Disparate Impact and the Institutionalization of
Affirmative Action (1987); Wrong Turns on the Road to Judicial Activism (1987);
Justice Without Law: A Reconsideration of the 'Broad Equitable Powers' of the
Federal Courts (1988); and Religious Liberty Under the Free Exercise Clause (1986).
One publication in particular described in great detail the administration's positions
on issues of federalism and congressional power (among other issues). The Justice
Department issued Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation ("Guidelines") on February
19, 1988, as a litigation manual for government lawyers.13 8 Each section analyzed the
relevant judicial doctrine on a particular issue and set forth the Reagan administration's
view of the correct interpretation of the law; each section concluded with lists of
134. Editorial, Why Give That Speech?, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A18.
135. Edwin Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1986, at
A21 , reprinted in 61 TUL. L. REv. 1003 (1987). Former Solicitor General Rex Lee, who served
in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1985, also wrote in support of a more modest reading
of Meese's speech. Lee suggested that Meese's "unfortunate" use of examples that suggested a
more "extreme" position-Cooper v. Aaron and President Lincoln-may be "attributable to an
over-zealous speech writer." Rex E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61
TUL. L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1987).
136. Meese, supra note 135, at 1003-04.
137. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at preface.
138. "Its purpose is to help ensure that principled and consistent positions are advocated by
all Executive Branch litigators, that constitutional and statutory prescriptions are faithfully
followed by the Executive Branch in making arguments, and that judicial policymaking is
discouraged." Id. at 1. The Guidelines opened with a letter signed by Meese directing that "[t]he
primary purpose of these Guidelines is to help government litigators think clearly about issues of
constitutional and statutory interpretation that arise in the course of their litigation." Id. at
preface.
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Supreme Court decisions that OLP considered "consistent" and "inconsistent" with the
administration's positions. The introduction stressed that the comprehensive guidelines
detailed therein were not "mere suggestions" but "should presumptively be followed"
and proposed departures cleared by supervisors.139 The unmistakable premise of the
Guidelines was that executive branch lawyers were to seek to advance the
administration's understanding of the Constitution' 4 0-and not simply what the courts
said the Constitution means 41-- even when at odds with "inconsistent" Supreme Court
decisions. 142
The Guidelines was comprehensive in its coverage and included issues that the
Reagan administration viewed as priorities for constitutional change, as well as other
issues, constitutional as well as statutory, frequently encountered by government
litigators. A theme throughout was a concern that "activist," unelected judges were
creating rights not properly found in the constitutional text or structure or original
intent of the framers, such as the right to privacy and the rights of criminal suspects.
Like many of the other OLP reports, the Guidelines sought to replace what the
administration viewed as judicial activism with what Meese had described as a
"Jurisprudence of Original Intention."'143 An early section directed government
attorneys to interpret constitutional provisions based only on their "original
meaning,"' 44 and listed the following "Decisions Inconsistent With These Principles of
Interpretation:"' 145 Griswold v. Connecticut,'46 Roe v. Wade,147 Sherbert v. Verner,
148
and Miranda v. Arizona.
149
139. Id. at 1.
140. The Guidelines acknowledged the difficulty of this task for government litigators in the
lower federal courts, the principal audience for this particular report: "For that reason, many of
these guidelines are expressed in terms of working to prevent the courts from compounding
existing errors" and "laying the groundwork for making stronger appellate arguments." Id. at 3.
"This focus does not, however, relieve government attorneys of their obligation to educate lower
courts (thereby laying the groundwork for making stronger appellate arguments) on the original
meaning of the relevant constitutional or statutory provision." Id.
141. "[T]he nostrum that 'the Constitution and statutes are what judges say they are' is true
purely as a political matter-to ensure, at least short term, predictability and stability-and not
as an ontological matter." Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 52, 58.
143. Speech Before the ABA, supra note 122, at 10.
144. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 3.
145. Id. at 8-10.
146. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state law that prohibited use of contraception by
married couples as violative of the right to privacy).
147. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state law that prohibited abortion as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment). The Guidelines also cited as "inconsistent" with the Reagan
administration's constitutional views the Court's reasoning in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), which recognized a right to be free from government-mandated sterilization.
GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 82.
148. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to an otherwise-qualified
individual who refused to work on her Sabbath violated the First Amendment guarantee of the
free exercise of religion).
149. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to advise suspects in custody of their rights
before beginning interrogations). The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed Miranda in Dickerson v.
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Regarding issues of governmental power, a thirty-four page section set forth
"guidelines on respecting the limited power granted to the federal government."' 50 As
that title suggests, this section advocated increased respect for state sovereignty and the
limited nature of the constitutional grants of power to Congress. Because this
publication predates the Rehnquist Court's enforcement of new federalism limits,
judicial precedent at the time did not support searching review of the sources of
congressional power to enact legislation. Indeed, the Guidelines acknowledged that for
half of a century, the courts rarely had found a federal statute beyond Congress's
power to enact.1 51 The Reagan administration sought to change the course of that
history by developing an alternative vision of governmental power and encouraging
courts to invalidate federal laws that did not comport with its view of congressional
power. The Reagan Department of Justice did not create these positions out of whole
cloth; the Guidelines drew heavily on the opinions of concurring and dissenting
Justices-and especially then-Justice Rehnquist-whose views, though not endorsed
by the Court at that time, since have been adopted by the five-Justice majority on the
Rehnquist Court.
52
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
150. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 36-69.
151. "As a matter of historical fact, during the last 50 years, very few federal statutes have
been held unconstitutional because they were beyond the range of the powers delegated to
Congress." Id. at 40 (citing 1 R. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.9 (1986)).
152. The Reagan administration's stance toward Congress as reflected in the Guidelines, it is
worth noting, deviated significantly from executive branch practice. The Guidelines
contradicted, and failed even to acknowledge, the Department of Justice's longstanding practice
of defending acts of Congress against constitutional challenge whenever a reasonable argument
could be made on their behalf. The executive branch thus traditionally has not sought to advance
its own constitutional views in this context.
Although administrations have differed slightly in how they articulated their responsibility to
defend federal statues, almost all recognized only two situations in which they would not defend
a federal statute. President Gerald Ford's then-Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee described
those exceptions as (1) where "upholding the statute would have the effect of limiting the
President's constitutional powers or prerogatives," and (2) where "the Attorney General
believes, not only personally as a matter of conscience, but also in his official capacity as the
Chief Legal Officer of the United States, that a law is so patently unconstitutional that it cannot
be defended." Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 5-6 (1975-1976)(statement of Rex Lee, Assistant Attorney General); see also The
Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980) (memorandum from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti
identifying similar exceptions); Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court
Jurisdiction to Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 13, 26
(1982) ("It is settled practice that the Department of Justice must and will defend Acts of
Congress except in the rare case when the statute either infringes on the constitutional power of
the Executive or when prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that the statute is invalid.").
The Guidelines, in sharp contrast, directed government litigators not to defend statutes that
were inconsistent with the Reagan administration's narrow view of congressional power: "If the
statute does not satisfy these requirements, the statute is unconstitutional and should not be
defended." GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 41. The Guidelines contained just a single sentence of
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The Reagan administration ultimately succeeded in advancing its views, not
through litigation-the specific means targeted by the Guidelines-but through
judicial appointments. The use of judicial selection as a means of promoting
constitutional change, as I will discuss, was the subject of a separate Department of
Justice report.153 The Guidelines, though, comprises the administration's most
comprehensive articulation of its constitutional vision for the law of congressional
power and federalism, with separate sections devoted to the Commerce Clause, state
sovereignty, and the Reconstruction Amendments.
1. Commerce Clause
A section on Congress's powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause acknowledged
that, at that time (1988), the Court interpreted the scope of congressional commerce
power to be "very broad." 54 The Guidelines, though, went on to suggest possible
avenues for limitations on the power: "Though very broad, the federal power under the
commerce clause nevertheless is subject to important limitations .... ,,,s5 Because the
Court had interpreted "commerce" broadly,' 56 the "real limits" must be found in the
phrase "among the several states."' 57 By limiting Congress's commerce power to
"among the several states," the Constitution "contemplates some residual power over
commerce not granted to Congress."'1s8
The Guidelines especially took issue with the Court's then-longstanding view that
Congress may regulate activities that, taken alone, do not substantially affect interstate
commerce, but when viewed in the aggregate, would have such effect. The Guidelines
rejected this aspect of the Court's doctrine as "untenable" because "at its extreme, this
approach could swallow the whole field of commerce, leaving nothing beyond the
reach of the commerce power." 15 9
This section's list of "Decisions Inconsistent with These Guidelines" included two
Supreme Court decisions. First, the Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn: 160
Wickard "stretches the power of Congress... to the breaking point,"'16' in allowing
congressional regulation of a farmer's productibn of wheat for home consumption
because of the cumulative effect on interstate commerce of all such home consumption.
Second, the Court's 1971 ruling in Perez v. United States, in which the Court upheld
caution in the other direction: "questionable cases should continue to be resolved in favor of
constitutionality." Id. Especially when read in context, this standard directs litigators to give far
less deference to Congress than past executive branch policy and practice.
153. See THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21.
154. Id. at 46.
155. Id. at 46-47.
156. The Guidelines cautioned, however, "[t]his is not to suggest that the range of activities
that constitute commerce is unlimited." Id. at 47.
157. Id. at 47-48.
158. Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. The Working Group on Federalism put it more bluntly: "Perhaps the greatest blow to
federalism has come from the Congress' and Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause." Working Group on Federalism, supra note 117, at 2.
160. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
161. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 54.
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Congress's authority to regulate extortionate credit transactions (i.e., loansharking)
because they, "though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect
interstate commerce:" 62 "[T]he dissent's general analysis is clearly right" in its view
that congressional power should exist here only if "loan sharking was an activity with
interstate attributes that distinguished it in some substantial respect from other local
crime,"
163
The Guidelines relied on then-Justice Rehnquist's 1981 concurrence in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n,164 in which he disavowed the Court's
broad definition of Congress's commerce power and deferential stance toward
Congress. It endorsed Rehnquist's proposed limits, including (1) the effect of activities
on interstate commerce must be "substantial," (2) congressional determinations and
findings regarding interstate effects are reviewable by courts, and (3) "[s]ome activities
may be so private or local in nature that they simply may not be in commerce."' 165 This
section concluded by directing government lawyers not to defend regulatory statutes
pursuant to Congress's commerce power "where Congress has not sufficiently
established a connection between the subject to be regulated and interstate or foreign
commerce."166
2. State Sovereignty
A closely related question, necessary for a complete picture of the scope of
Congress's commerce power, is whether the Constitution imposes any additional limits
on Congress's ability to exercise its commerce power when the states are among the
subjects of the regulation. While Reagan held office, the Court actually removed a
federalism-based judicial constraint on congressional power. In 1985,67 the Court
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,' 68 the only case since 1937 in which it
had relied on the Tenth Amendment to invalidate a federal statute. Some additional
background here is useful.
In 1976, a divided five-to-four Court held in National League of Cities that
Congress had violated the Constitution by applying the minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local employees. The
Court emphasized that the challenge did not question the Court's decisions defining
the breadth of Congress's commerce power, which empowered Congress to impose the
requirements on private employers. But, the Court found, when Congress exercises
otherwise plenary powers against the states, "there are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty,"'' 69 limits that are made express in the Tenth
Amendment. The Court struck down the provisions as applied to the states, because
they "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
162. 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
163. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 52.
164. 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981).
165. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 48 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original)).
166. Id. at 49.
167. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
168. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
169. Id. at 842.
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areas of traditional governmental functions."'' 70
The Court never again relied on the "traditional governmental function" test to
invalidate a federal law, and in 1985, Justice Blackmun, the critical fifth vote in
National League of Cities, provided the fifth vote to overrule that case in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
explained that the "traditional governmental function" test had proven unworkable in
practice, and inconsistent with established principles of federalism. 7 1 More generally,
citing the "elusiveness of objective criteria for 'fundamental' elements of state
sovereignty,"'172 the Court disavowed its earlier attempt to impose judicial limits on
congressional power and concluded that the political processes and Congress-not the
courts-provide the principal safeguards for state sovereignty.173 Justice Rehnquist
wrote a separate one-paragraph dissent to express confidence that the views of the four
dissenting Justices would "in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court."'
174
The Reagan administration's White House Working Group on Federalism agreed
with Rehnquist and denounced Garcia and recommended that the Department of
Justice seek a case in which to urge the Court to overrule it:175 "[T]he nadir in the
decline of federalism was reached last year in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority." 76 Several'years later, though, the Guidelines notably did not call
for the overruling of Garcia or include it on the list of "Decisions Inconsistent With
This Guideline."
Instead, the Guidelines urged an extremely strained reading of Garcia that would
greatly limit the extent to which it would serve as on obstacle to judicial promotion of
state sovereignty. The Guidelines conceded that Garcia stressed the primacy of the
political processes in protecting state sovereignty, but stressed this part of the opinion
was only dictum. "We do not read the opinion as saying, however, that state protection
is to be found only in the deliberations of Congress, which shall be free from judicial
review in all cases."'17 Such a reading "cannot be squared with the Constitution."'' 78
170. Id. at 852. Justice Blackmun, who provided the fifth vote for the majority, concurred to
say that he joined the Court's opinion with the understanding that it essentially endorsed a
balancing test, so that federal power would exist, for example, in areas such as environmental
protection, where state compliance would be essential. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
171. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
172. Id. at 548.
173. "State sovereign interests.., are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power." Id. at 552. "[TJhe principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state
participation in federal governmental action." Id. at 556. "[T]he fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of
process rather than one of result." Id. at 554.
174. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175. Working Group on Federalism, supra note 117, at 10.
176. Id. at3.
177. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 56 (emphasis in original). Notably, in the Garcia case
itself, Reagan's Solicitor General had urged the Court not to overrule NationalLeague of Cities,
but also had argued for a limited reading that would have allowed the application of federal
minimum wage requirements to public employees of the San Antonio mass transit system. See
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Government attorneys were directed to argue that, notwithstanding Garcia's dictum to
the contrary, the federal courts have a duty to enforce the constitutional guarantees of
state sovereignty. 179 Again, the Department of Justice relied on the limited nature of
the Constitution's delegation of federal power and the Tenth Amendment for its view
that "the greater number of all governmental powers... were 'reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people."",180 The Guidelines, though, provided little specific
guidance regarding the kinds of limits courts should impose on congressional power in
the furtherance of state sovereignty.
3. Reconstruction Amendments
The section of the Guidelines most disdainful of the Court's precedent regarding
federal power addressed Congress's powers under the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and in particular Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. The section opened with the
declaration that, beginning in 1966, the Court had taken a wrong turn:
While the obvious focus of these provisions is upon a remedial authority to
"enforce" the substantive provisions of the amendments, in a series of cases since
1966 the Supreme Court has suggested that the scope of Congress's enforcement
powers might extend beyond such remedial authority and enable the Congress to
define, beyond their original meaning, the substantive guarantees and applicability
of these amendments.
The Reagan Justice Department interpreted Congress's textually assigned
enforcement powers as more limited and as not including any role in defining the
substantive meaning of the constitutional guarantees contained in the first sections of
the Reconstruction Amendments. The Guidelines warned of the "extreme
consequences" for "the federalist system"' 82 of the Court's suggestion that Congress
could in some instances enact legislation premised on its own interpretations of
provisions such as the guarantees of equal protection and due process: Congress would
be empowered "virtually at will" to set "uniform, national policies in a wide variety of
areas."'' 83 Specially singled out for derision was what the Guidelines described as the
Court's "remarkable 'ratchet' theory" in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 84 "by which the
Congress is apparently able only to modify the particular provision by reading such
Brief for the Secretary of Labor & Supplemental Brief for the Secretary of Labor, Garcia, 469
U.S. 528 (Nos. 82-1913, 82-1951); cf supra note 152 (discussing the longstanding Department
of Justice practice of making all reasonable arguments in defense of acts of Congress against
constitutional challenge).
178. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 56.
179. "In litigation involving federal action affecting the states, government attorneys should
argue that the Constitution protects the sovereignty of the states and that the federal courts have
a duty to enforce the Constitution in this regard." Id. at 54.
180. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id.
183. Id at 57.
184. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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provision in a more expansive manner."' 85 The Guidelines also emphasized the
importance of limiting the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
violations by state actors.186
At the same time it criticized the Court for allowing Congress a role in defining the
meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments, the executive branch was seeking
through the Guidelines to substitute its own interpretations of the Amendments for
those of the Court. 87 Among the Court's decisions the Guidelines listed as
"inconsistent" with the Reagan administration's views were Katzenbach v. Morgan,
Oregon v. Mitchell, and City of Rome v. United States.88 The Guidelines also rejected
the suggestion of six Justices in United States v. Guest'89 that Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not limited to state action, but could
extend to conspiracies by private persons to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.' 90 Interestingly, the Guidelines do not challenge, or even mention,
the Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 19' finding broad congressional
power pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
The call for more aggressive judicial review of acts of Congress contrasts with the
usual criticism of the Guidelines-and the Reagan administration-that the courts
were unduly "activist" and too quick to find constitutional defects in legislative
enactments. For example, elsewhere the Guidelines condemned the "judicial creation
of rights not reasonably found in the Constitution" citing as examples the right to
privacy and rights of criminal suspects. 92 The Guidelines acknowledged this
difference in stance: "Rather than the usual problem of exercising authority it does not
have, this guideline concerns thejudiciary's failure to exercise appropriately its power
to hold invalid unconstitutional congressional actions.'' 
B. Constitutional Change through Judicial Selection
The Reagan administration promoted its comprehensive vision of the law through
the exercise of various presidential powers. On issues of federalism and congressional
power, President Reagan's federalism executive order directed that his views guide
185. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 59.
186. Id. at 57-59.
187. "Government attorneys reviewing congressional enactments premised on these
enforcement' provisions should not rely on or contribute to the transformation of the authority
to enforce the guarantees of these amendments into the power to expand the nature and breadth
of these substantive guarantees." Id. at 56.
188. Id at 56, 58-59; see supraqnotes 81-99 and accompanying text (discussing cases). The
Guidelines also cited disapprovingly, without additional commentary, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488
U.S. 448 (1980). GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 59.
189. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
190. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 58-59.
191. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that Congress possesses broad power, pursuant to Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, to prohibit racial discrimination by private actors in the context
of real estate transactions).
192. GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 8; see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
193. Id. at 57. Again, this is an extraordinary statement given the longstanding executive
branch practice of defending acts of Congress whenever a reasonable argument could be made in
their defense. See THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21.
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every executive branch policy that had federalism implications, with policy defined
broadly to include "regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation." 194 And
the Guidelines directed all governmental lawyers to urge the courts to adopt the
administration's views. Ultimately, though, President Reagan's greatest influence on
the development of constitutional meaning came, not through his administration's
litigation positions, but through his judicial appointments, and especially his
appointments to the United States Supreme Court. 
195
A separate Reagan administration report issued by the Office of Legal Policy
("OLP") in 1988, six months after the Guidelines, endorsed the selection ofjudges as a
means of influencing how the courts would interpret the Constitution in the future. The
Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation, was a
199-page guide to substantive legal issues likely to be affected by the future
appointment of Justices to the Supreme Court. 96 The introduction noted that the
choice of Justices likely would be critical to what the Constitution, and hence the
Nation, would look like a dozen years hence, in the year 2000: "There are few factors
that are more critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more often
overlooked, than the values and philosophies of the men and women who populate the
third co-equal branch of the national government-the federal judiciary."197 The report
addressed not only presidential consideration of potential nominees' legal views, but
also encouraged "the most thorough and informed" evaluation by senators of both
political parties.198 Notably, OLP, the author of this and the many other reports that
detailed the Reagan administration's legal positions, also was the office at the
Department of Justice entrusted with assisting President Reagan with the selection of
federal judges.'"
OLP recognized that much would be at stake in filling upcoming vacancies on the
194. Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 11, § l(a).
195. President Reagan's appointment to the lower federal courts also proved influential in
shaping constitutional doctrine. Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have written:
It is, for example, unthinkable that the Supreme Court would ever have reviewed
the federal statute at issue in Lopez if the Fifth Circuit had not struck it down in the
first place. The same may well be true with regard to the Violence Against Women
Act, whose relevant provisions had been held unconstitutional by the Fourth
Circuit in an opinion written by the extremely conservative Circuit Judge Michael
Luttig.
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1074 (footnotes omitted).
196. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21.
197. Id. atv.
198. "[I]t is hoped that this report will allow Members of(Congress of both parties, pursuant
to their constitutional responsibilities, to assess judicial nominees in the most thorough and
informed manner possible." Id. "As the traditional lead agency in the executive branch in the
judicial selection process, the Department of Justice believes that this report will prove helpful in
communicating to the public, the media and Members of Congress the growing importance of
the judicial selection process." Id. at iv.
199. See Stephen J. Markman, Judicial Selection: The Reagan Years, in NATIONAL LEGAL
CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 33-47
(1990) (a description of the judicial selection process and the role of the Office of Legal Policy
by Reagan's Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy from 1985 to 1989); THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21, at vii.
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Court.200 Each of the fifteen chapters in The Constitution in the Year 2000 analyzed a
major constitutional controversy, "the resolution of which is likely to be sharply
influenced by the judicial philosophies of the individual justices who sit on the
Court.",201 Among the diverse issues addressed: the right to privacy, the rights of
criminal defendants, the Takings Clause and property rights, rights of sexual
orientation, separation of powers issues, the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, and
First Amendment issues of religion and freedom of association.
The tone and style of this report differed significantly from that of the Guidelines,
because of the different purposes of the two reports. Rather than detail the
administration's positions (as, for example, the Guidelines did), The Constitution in the
Year 2000 presented two possible directions the Court might take for each of the
fifteen issues the report assessed. OLP wrote that its intent was to describe the alternate
routes "in as neutral and balanced a manner as possible. 2 °2 It nonetheless was entirely
clear, from this report as well as other Reagan administration statements and actions,
that President Reagan believed the "activist" courts generally were on the wrong
course and that he cared deeply about which future path they would take for virtually
every issue discussed in this report.20 3
One of the fifteen chapters concerned federalism and was entitled "Will the Tenth
Amendment Play a Significant Role in Protecting the States from Federal Control?"
The chapter described the two paths then open to the Court: either continue in the
direction in which Garcia pointed, that is, judicial abdication of federalism issues to
the political branches and processes, or restore ajudicial role such as that in National
League of Cities, in which the courts would enforce limits on federal power and
uphold state sovereignty as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment and the constitutional
structure.
In addition to highlighting what was at stake on this overriding question of the
appropriate role for the courts in the protection of state sovereignty, the report
introduced a related issue: Congress's spending power. The Constitution in the Year
2000 observed: "Besides modifying its doctrine regarding direct federal regulation of
state and local governmental activity, the Court in the 1990's might reconsider its
doctrine regarding the imposition of conditions upon federal grants to the states. ' ,204
The report noted ways in which the Court could protect states from federal laws that
would require states to waive aspects of state autonomy in return for funding. The
Court could adopt doctrines similar to those used to protect individuals from
unconstitutional conditions: states could be protected from "abusive grant conditions"
200. "The purpose of this report is to provide a glimpse of the stakes that are involved in the
manner in which the ongoing debate is resolved in the highest court of the land-the United
States Supreme Court." THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21, at iii.
201. Id.
202. Id. at iv.
203. "There have been few times in the history of our country at which former Chief Justice
Hughes' famous statement that 'the Constitution of the United States is what the judges say it is'
has more accurately depicted the state of American jurisprudence." Id. at iii; see also GOLDMAN,
supra note 19, at 285-345.
204. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21, at 137. "Under the Supreme
Court's current doctrine,... states receive virtually no judicial protection from the leverage that
Congress can place upon them with conditional grants." Id. at 134.
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just as the Court had ruled that the government cannot require an individual to
surrender rights as a condition of receiving a grant.20 5 The Court also could adopt
Justice O'Connor's suggestion in dissent in South Dakota v. Dole 206 that the courts
require a stronger nexus between grant conditions and the purposes of federal
programs.20 7 The report summarized the Court's choices as follows:
If the Supreme Court in the next decade adheres to its current doctrine in the area
of federalism, Congress will have essentially unrestricted power to displace state
policies through direct regulation, conditional grants, and conditional tax
exemptions. On the other hand, the Court could modify or even overrule Garcia,
as some Justices have suggested, and restore to the states some measure ofjudicial
protection from congressional activity.
208
C. The Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power
The course the Rehnquist Court has chosen is clear. While Congress's spending
power remains an issue for the future,20 9 the Court's decisions through the year 2002
have moved constitutional law quite close to the Reagan administration's ideal on
issues of Congress's commerce and Section 5 powers and the role of the courts in
protecting state sovereignty. Also clear is the reason for the success of Reagan's
constitutional agenda. Almost every Rehnquist Court decision that narrowed
congressional power and expanded state sovereignty was decided by the same five-to-
four margin.2t0 Of the five Justices in the majority, sometimes referred to as the
"federalism five," President Reagan appointed three: Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy. William H. Rehnquist was the one member of the
"federalism five" already on the Court when President Reagan took office, and Reagan
elevated him to Chief Justice in 1986. The Reagan administration relied heavily on
Rehnquist's opinions in formulating its constitutional views on federalism and
congressional power, citing them frequently, for example, in the Guidelines. 211 The
205. Id at 137-38. On this point, the report cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
and F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). But see GUIDELINES, supra note
20, at 9 (taking position that Sherbert was wrongly decided).
206. 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21, at 138.
208. Id. at 136. "Many of these restrictions have worthwhile purposes, but there arguably is
little reason why these matters could not have been left to the individual states." Id at 133.
209. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting offthe Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to
Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003) (assessing likelihood the Rehnquist Court will limit Congress's
spending power, including in Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001), rev'd, 123 S.
Ct. 720 (2003)).
210. The two exceptions: City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
211. Even when in the minority, Rehnquist consistently favored a strong judicial role in the
protection of state sovereignty. To summarize briefly, he authored National League ofCities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and when the Court overruled that case in 1985, Rehnquist
predicted in dissent that he once again would be in the majority. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
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critical fifth vote came when Reagan's successor, former Vice President George H.W.
Bush, appointed Clarence Thomas to the Court in 199 1.212
1. Commerce Clause
In 1995, seven years after the Reagan Department of Justice issued the Guidelines
and The Constitution in the Year 2000, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
majority of five Justices, narrowed the Court's definition of Congress's commerce
power for the first time since 1937. In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that
Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990.213 In the year 2000, the Court, by the same five-to-four split, solidified and
clarified its new reading of the commerce power. In United States v. Morrison, the
Court declared unconstitutional the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act, which would have allowed the victims of gender-motivated violence a
federal cause of action against their assailants.
21 4
The Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison is
strikingly similar to that urged by the Reagan administration. Like the Guidelines, the
Court generally justified the imposition of judicial limits by describing the
constitutional grant of the commerce power as a limited one that contemplates some
activities left to state regulation. The Court articulated a framework of three categories
of activity that the commerce power may reach and, like the Guidelines, focused its
concerns and limits on the regulation of activities the cumulative effect of which
affects interstate commerce. The Court expressly adopted the positions, advanced by
the Reagan Justice Department and earlier by Rehnquist in his Hodel concurrence, that
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In 1981, he wrote separately
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining to disavow the Court's broad definition of Congress's
commerce power and suggest limits. 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He
also dissented from the Court's broad definitions of Congress's powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments, presaging the Court's current position (which he described for the majority in
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)), that to allow Congress to define the scope of
rights as part of its enforcement powers would infringe on the Court's constitutionally assigned
role. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 206-21 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Finally, he dissented from the Court's 1989 ruling that Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its commerce power, and he authored the Court's 1996 opinion in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989)).
212. When in 1990 then-Counsel to President George H.W. Bush, C. Boyden Gray, was
asked how the judicial selection process under President Bush would compare to President
Reagan's approach, Gray responded: "It's structured a little differently, but the result is very
much the same." Neil Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1990, A 1. Gray said the aim "is to shift the courts in a more conservative direction." Id.
While the appointment of Clarence Thomas certainly has achieved that aim, Associate Justice
David H. Souter, also appointed by President Bush, consistently has joined the four dissenters.
213. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
214. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Supreme Court has also interpreted federal statutes narrowly
to avoid what the Court viewed as serious questions as to whether Congress had exceeded its
commerce power. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
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the effect must be substantial, 21 5 and that the courts should review Congress's findings
regarding the interstate effect.216
The Court's approach differs from the Guidelines, though, in at least two respects.
First, and not at all surprising given the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court limited the
potential reach of its reasoning in Wickard v. Filburn and Perez v, United States, but
did not overrule those decisions.1 7 Second, the way in which the Court avoided
overruling those decisions while nonetheless imposing new limits was to consider only
"economic" activity when evaluating the adequacy of the cumulative effects on
interstate commerce. 218 While the Guidelines also focused its call for new limits on
those instances that involved the aggregation of intrastate activity, the Guidelines did
not go so far as to suggest the creation of a formalistic economic/noneconomic
distinction, reminiscent in the words of the four dissenters in Morrison of the long-
discredited "old formalism" of the pre-1937 Court.219
2. State Sovereignty
The Rehnquist Court also has not overruled Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.220 Instead, consistent with the approach advocated in the Guidelines,
the Court has rejected Garcia's dictum about leaving protection of state interests to the
political processes, and has created two new, quite complicated categories ofjudicial
limits on Congress's ability effectively to regulate the states.
First, the Court twice in the last decade has relied on a new "anticommandeering"
doctrine to invalidate congressional efforts to compel state action.22' First, in 1992, by
a six-to-three vote, the Court held that Congress could not "commandeer" state
governments by compelling state lawmakers to provide for the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste.222 This marked the first time since the Court overruled National
League of Cities (and only the second time since 1937) that the Court relied on notions
of state sovereignty to find that Congress had exceeded its commerce power. The
Court extended this principle to the "commandeering" of state executive officials in
1997 when, by the typical five-four split, it invalidated provisions of the Brady
215. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
216. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575.
217. The Court limited Wickardby stressing what the Court described as the economic nature
of the activity involved: "Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; see also id. at 573-74
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Perez v. United States and similar authorities "are not
called in question by our decision today").
218. "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
219. Id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
221. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
222. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 ("The Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.").
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Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state and local law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.223
Second, even though after Garcia, Congress, in the exercise of its commerce power,
generally may apply federal requirements to the states (as long as it avoids
"commandeering" the states), the Court has created new state sovereign immunity
doctrine that severely limits Congress's ability to provide for the enforcement of its
laws against states. The same five-Justice majority that narrowed Congress's
commerce power also has raised the constitutional bar to subjecting states to private
suits for money damages for violations of federal statutory rights. The Court
previously had held that Congress could abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from private lawsuits in federal court, specifically upholding abrogation
when Congress acted pursuant to its Section 5 authority224 and its commerce power.
225
In 1996, the Court, divided five-four, overruled its decision that found that Congress
could rely on its commerce power to authorize private suits against states. This left
only Congress's Reconstruction Amendment authorities as valid bases for the
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.226
The Court further substantially narrowed Congress's authority to authorize suits
against states in 1999, when it held that states were immune from private suit not only
in federal court, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, but also in state court. The text
of the Eleventh Amendment expressly is limited to the federal judicial power, but in
Alden v. Maine, the Court held that the constitutional structure and history supported
state immunity in state courts as well. 227 In May 2002, the Court took an additional
leap and applied its expansive notions of state sovereign immunity before courts to
hearings before a federal agency (here, the Federal Maritime Agency). 228 The Court
conceded that the constitutional text and history provided little, if any, support, but
found this limitation on congressional power inherent in the constitutional structure.
22 9
The Rehnquist Court's expansion of state sovereign immunity greatly increases the
significance of the scope of Congress's power under the Reconstruction Amendments,
for they are the only remaining means by which Congress may subject a nonconsenting
state to private suits for damages for violation of federal law.
3. Reconstruction Amendments
It is with regard to Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments
that the Reagan administration most fully has achieved its goals. In a series of
decisions beginning in 1997,230 the Rehnquist Court has adopted almost all of the
Guidelines' recommended limitations on Congress's Section 5 authority. In the
process, the Court has held that Congress exceeded its Section 5 power in enacting
223. Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
224. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
225. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
226. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1
(1989)).
227. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
228. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 53 U.S. 743 (2002).
229. Id. at 1872.
230. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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major portions of federal laws enacted with strong bipartisan majorities to protect a
range of civil rights, including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,"' the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,232 the Violence Against Women Act,233 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act,234 as well as provisions of the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Classification Act that subjected states to remedies for
patent infringement.235
Most fundamentally, and consistent with the Guidelines, the Court has held that
Congress's power to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
include any authority to define the substantive meaning of those guarantees.236 As the
Guidelines advocated, the Court expressly rejected readings of Katzenbach v.
Morgan237 and Oregon v. Mitchell2 38 that, to the contrary, would have allowed
Congress to interpret the guarantee of equal protection as being more protective of
rights than the Court's definition of those rights for purposes of judicial
enforcement.239 Moreover, the Court treated the tiers of equal protection judicial
scrutiny, originally created by the courts as a mechanism ofjudicial self-restraint out
of deference to legislative power, as part of the substantive meaning of the
constitutional guarantees and thus as themselves a limitation on legislative power. The
practical effect: to make exceedingly difficult any congressional enforcement of the
guarantee of equal protection to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, disability,
sexual orientation, or any other characteristic beyond those few identified by the Court
as suspect or quasi-suspect.240 Congress first must identify "a history and pattern of
231. Id.
232. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
233. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
234. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
235. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
236. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("lilt is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define
the substance of constitutional guarantees."); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)
("[Congress] has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes
a constitutional violation."). The Court has not addressed Congress's power pursuant to Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and whether, in Professor Lawrence Sager's words, "Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. survives the Court's recent Section 5 decisions." Lawrence G. Sager, A
Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 151 (2000); see also Amar, supra note 104, at 823-24. The Second Circuit
recently held that it does. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
237. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
238. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
239. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28 (discussing Morgan and Katzenbach). "There is language in
... Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to
enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is
not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one." Id.
240. The Court has emphasized that the absence of Section 5 authority does not leave the
objects of Congress's protections without any recourse. For example, in Garrett, the Court
wrote:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I [of the
Americans with Disabilities Act] does not mean that persons with disabilities have
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unconstitutional [i.e., irrational] discrimination by the States" against the group that
Congress seeks to protect.24 1 In addition, and also as specifically urged by the
Guidelines, the Court has reaffirmed a strong requirement of state action and
disavowed the suggestion in Guest that appropriate enforcement efforts in some cases
could reach private actors.
242
The Court has gone beyond the specific limitations endorsed by the Guidelines,
and, consistent with their spirit, adopted limits on Congress's ability to implement even
what the Court found to be properly within Congress's enforcement authority: the
authority to remedy and prevent violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the
Court's newly created "congruence and proportionality" standard, the Court will
closely scrutinize Congress's remedial and preventive measures to ensure that
Congress in fact is not seeking to redefine the substantive scope of the constitutional
guarantee. 243 The Court's review of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in
particular, demonstrates that the Court will demand an extremely close fit between
Congress's remedial and preventive measures and what courts would find are judicially
cognizable constitutional violations, which leaves relatively little room for Congress to
go beyond the courts. Academic commentary overwhelmingly has condemned the
Court's creation of these limits2 "4 and has agreed instead with Justice Breyer's dissent
for four Justices, which concludes that the Court has usurped congressional power
"through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to
distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies. 245
no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes
standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United
States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions
for injunctive relief under Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In addition, state
laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other
aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
241. Id. at 368.
242. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622-24 (2000). The Rehnquist Court also,
consistent with the Guidelines, rejected the suggestion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980), that Congress possessed special authority to devise race-based measures to counter the
continuing effects of past discrimination, and instead held that any governmental use of race in
decisionmaking must survive strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
243. The Court first announced this test in Boerne: "There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect."
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
244. See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 7; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6; Colker & Brudney,
supra note 40; Kramer, supra note 29; Post & Siegel, supra note 68; see also Symposium,
Congressional Power in the Shadow of the Rehnquist Court: Strategies for the Future, 78 IND.
L.J. i (2003); Symposium, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv.
597 (1998); Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (2001).
245. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also criticized the Court
for failing to adhere to the deferential standard of review adopted in Katzenbach v. Morgan, in
recognition that "[Section] 5's 'draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision
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The only Supreme Court precedent regarding the Reconstruction Amendments that
the Guidelines targeted but the Court has not yet rejected is City of Rome v. United
States.z46 The Court in Rome upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
prohibited certain voting practices that had a discriminatory racial impact, without
requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination. Federal civil rights laws and
regulations that prohibited practices on the basis of disparate impact were a special
target of the Reagan administration. 247 More generally, the Court has not yet had
occasion to reconsider congressional authority in the context of race or sex
discrimination, where the courts apply heightened scrutiny and provide greater
protection, though it may do so in its review of whether the Family and Medical Leave
Act is appropriate Section 5 legislation aimed at gender discrimination.
2 48
The Court has offered remarkably little analysis in support of its new limits,
announcing them first in a case249 that involved an express congressional challenge to
the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, 250 and then purporting simply to apply that
precedent, with little additional analysis, in future cases where the results were
extraordinary. 25' The Court, though, has alluded to two distinct rationales. First, it has
echoed the Reagan administration's federalism concerns about affording Congress
sweeping national power to legislate at the expense of state power.252 Second, the
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and
Proper Clause... ."' Id. at 386 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,650 (1966)); see
also id. at 387 (noting the Court's Section 5 decisions are described as approaching "strict
scrutiny," in Post & Siegel, supra note 68, at 477, and 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16 (3d ed. 2000)).
246. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
247. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1987).
248. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom.,
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding that the FMLA was within
Congress's Section 5 authority to remedy and prevent gender discrimination). But see Kazmier
v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (reaching opposite conclusion).
249. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In adopting these limits on Congress's
Section 5 authority, the Court dismissed, with surprisingly little consideration, widely debated
theories in support of a congressional role in giving meaning to the open-ended guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
250. In an article fittingly entitled How Not to Challenge the Court, Neal Devins writes:
Congress and the White House-through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)-backed the Court into a comer. Specifically, because RFRA called for
"the most demanding test known to constitutional law," Congress limited the
Court's role in defining the parameters of First Amendment religious liberty
protections to clarifying ambiguous language in RFRA, rather than actually
interpreting the Constitution. Adding insult to injury, lawmakers condemned the
Court for its "disastrous," "dastardly and unprovoked," "devastating"
"degradation," if not "virtual[ ] eliminat[ion]," of religious liberty protections.
Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 645, 645 (1998)
(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
251. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
252. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is a most serious
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Court has added a concern of its own: the preservation of its view of judicial power.
Although it cites Marbury v. Madison253 for support,25 4 the Court in fact is acting on a
form of judicial supremacy that surpasses even its strongest previous assertions of
power.
255
IV. LESSONS REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
What follows from President Reagan's largely successful efforts to change the law
of federalism and congressional power? The clearest, most vital lesson is simply stated
and generally familiar, though widely underappreciated: the constitutional views of the
President and Congress matter-they matter a great deal. Not only the Supreme Court,
but also the political branches of the federal government influence the development of
constitutional meaning. Although decisions of the judiciary dominate our
understanding of the Constitution and the political branches typically defer to the
Court's views, our national elected officials possess a range of constitutional powers-
most notably here, the power to select the members of the third branch-that they may
choose to exercise to effect substantial changes in the direction of constitutional law.
Consider the following: What if President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Dealers in Congress had not voiced and acted upon their own constitutional views and
instead had accepted the Court's narrow view of congressional power? What if, out of
charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal
protection of the laws .... "); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (describing RFRA as "a considerable
congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate
for the health and welfare of their citizens."). But see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)) ("Rules for
interpreting Section 5 that would provide States with special protection, however, run counter to
the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . '[Pirinciples of federalism that might
otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation." Those Amendments were
specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."').
253. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
254. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("[E]ver since Marbury, this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529
(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177) ("If Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.' ... Shifting legislative majorities could
change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process
contained in Article V."); id. at 536 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177) ("When the
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch,
which embraces the duty to say what the law is."); cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
437 (2000) ("Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying
the Constitution.").
255. See TIBE, supra note 245, at 267 ("Properly understood, both Cooper and Marbury v.
Madison are consistent with Katzenbach v. Morgan."); id. at 254-67; Kramer, supra note 29, at
13 (contrasting "judicial supremacy," which allows the Court "the last word" with the Court's
current "judicial sovereignty," which asserts the Court's authority to have "the only word")
(emphasis in original); id. at 14 ("The Rehnquist Court no longer views itself as first among
equals, but has instead staked its claim to being the only institution empowered to speak with
authority when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution.") (emphasis in original).
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deference to the Court and adherence to a notion of judicial supremacy, they simply
had declined to enact legislation such as the Social Security Act and the National
Labor Relations Act and had not considered extraordinary proposals to expand the
number of Justices and amend the Constitution?
25 6
President Reagan's efforts to transform constitutional meaning put him in a class
with Franklin D. Roosevelt and a handful of other Presidents.257 Reagan developed and
pursued a constitutional vision extraordinary in its breadth of issues, its detail of
analysis, and its ambition for presidential power. Reagan's success in implementing his
vision was not as immediate or complete as that enjoyed by President Roosevelt, nor
have the Rehnquist Court's decisions imposed the kind of immediate and widespread
harms that helped make the pre-1937 Court the subject of great public debate and
controversy. Nonetheless, with the benefit of the Court's decisions since 1995 and the
previously unexamined Department of Justice reports, we are better able to appreciate
that, at least on issues of congressional power and federalism, Reagan's success has
been considerable and continues.
The Reagan administration's efforts to remake constitutional law are best evaluated
in light of a rich academic literature on constitutional change that examines democratic
influences on constitutional meaning. Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson's
theory of "partisan entrenchment" is particularly helpful in understanding Reagan's
responsibility for the constitutional change now underway. 258 They describe the
judicial appointment process as a means by which the people influence the
development of constitutional law through their choice of Presidents and senators.
Political parties play a central role in representing popular understandings not only
about "ordinary politics," but also "about the deepest meanings of the Constitution and
the country., 2 59 The political party that controls the presidency chooses judges to its
liking, subject to "whatever counterweight the Senate provides," and those judges
continue to influence the development of constitutional doctrine long after the
individuals responsible for their appointment have left office. 260 Thus, "[t]he theory of
partisan entrenchment sees the relationship between constitutional law and politics as
roughly but imperfectly democratic. 26'
256. Ackerman posits a similar "grim thought-experiment": what if Roosevelt had been
assassinated and the more conservative Southern Vice President, John Nance Garner, had taken
office and vetoed the Social Security Act and the Labor Act? Ackerman suggests that the
strength of opposition to the Court was sufficiently great that New Dealers in Congress would
have responded with a constitutional amendment, "[i]n the same way Republicans reacted to
President Johnson's vetoes of the Civil Rights Act and Freedmen's Bureau Bill" with the
Fourteenth Amendment. ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 271-72.
257. See supra note 121.
258. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6.
259. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1078. Political parties "collect, filter, co-opt and
accumulate the constitutional beliefs and aspirations of the party faithful, of prospective voters,
and, perhaps equally crucially, of social movements." Id. at 1077.
260. Id. at 1076. Judges therefore represent "a temporally extended majority." Id.
261. Id. Professor Laurence Tribe also has written of the opportunities the constitutional
structure creates for democratic influences on constitutional interpretation:
[D]espite the growth of federal judicial power, the Constitution remains in
significant degree a democratic document-not only written, ratified and amended
through essentially democratic processes but indeed open at any given time to
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Balkin and Levinson recognize that presidential/partisan/democratic influences may
result in "slow and steady" constitutional change as consequential as "quick and
decisive" change, 262 and they expressly credit Reagan for the Rehnquist Court's recent
shifts:
If judicial review and constitutional change tend to operate through partisan
entrenchment, it is fairly easy to explain Garrett and its predecessors. The
federalism, voting rights, and affirmative action cases that we have witnessed in
the last decade are the predictable (though not inevitable) product of a
conservative Republican hegemony during the 1980s and early 1990s that
produced judges and Justices sympathetic with Reagan's vision of federalism and
states' rights, a vision well reflected in a 1987 executive order setting out a series
of "fundamental federalism principles."
263
competing interpretations limited only by the values which inform the
Constitution's provisions themselves, and by the complex political processes that
the Constitution creates-processes which on various occasions give the Supreme
Court, Congress, the President, or the states, the last word in constitutional debate.
TRIBE, supra note 245, at 267. As Professor Levinson noted at the time, see Levinson, supra
note 131, at 1075-76, the Wall Street Journal quoted an almost identical statement from Tribe's
1978 edition of his treatise, in support of Attorney General Meese's 1986 Tulane speech. See
supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text; cf Robin West, Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 641, 651 (1990) (citing Owen Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 753-54 (1982)) ("Progressives need to create a world in
which it is clear that a progressive Congress has embraced one set of constitutional meanings,
and the conservative Court a contrasting and incompatible set. The Supreme Court does, and
always has, as Fiss reminds us, read the Constitution so as to avoid crisis. The lesson to draw is
surely that only when faced with such a constitutional moment will this conservative Court
change paths.").
262. Id. at 1083.
263. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1073-74. Balkin and Levinson note that their theory
of partisan entrenchment has much in common with Ackerman's theory of "constitutional
moments" that effect change outside the formal Article V amendment process. Id. at 1079; see
also Siegel, supra note 68; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). Both theories emphasize the important roles played by
nonjudicial actors in constitutional change-by "citizens and politicians" and "social
movements, political parties, and presidents." Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1079. Balkin
and Levinson, however, dispense with Ackerman's core concept of "constitutional moments," a
difference that proves significant in their assessments of Reagan's influence. Ackerman
distinguishes between "normal" and "transformative" Supreme Court appointments, with the
former leading to "ordinary" constitutional change and the latter to the possibility of
"constitutional moments" of extraordinary change. ACKERmAN, supra note 22, at 389-400.
While Ackerman's theory allows for recognition of Reagan's influences through the "normal
evolutionary process," id. at 392, his focus on identifying "constitutional moments" leads him, in
that context, to highlight Reagan's failures. Ackerman concludes that Reagan (unlike Roosevelt)
was not successful in his attempt to make "transformative" appointments and effect a
"constitutional moment," id. at 389-400, and even entitles a section on Reagan, "Anatomy of
Failure." Id at 390. By contrast, Balkin and Levinson conclude, "[T]he changes to constitutional
meaning are no less real even thought [sic] they do not fit easily into the model of a
constitutional moment." Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1083.
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Their theory suggests also that an appropriate response for those who disagree with the
constitutional views of President Reagan and the Rehnquist Court is political change,
and in particular the election of Presidents and senators who will promote different
constitutional visions through their judicial appointments. 26
A second lesson, closely related to the first: the Reagan/Rehnquist experience
underscores the importance of a broader and deeper public understanding of the roles
ofnonjudicial actors in the processes of constitutional change, currently the subject of
vibrant academic debate. The Rehnquist Court's view of judicial supremacy, while
close to the Court-centered view predominant among the public and the legal
profession generally, runs counter to the trend among legal academics who write about
these issues.265
Central to the focus of this Article, and the Symposium of which it is a part, is the
potential role of constitutional scholars in narrowing the gap between them and the
public and improving popular understanding of how constitutional change does and
should occur, including the fallacy and perils of judicial interpretive exclusivity.
Although Presidents Roosevelt and Reagan moved the law in opposite substantive
directions, the efforts of both were premised on a recognition that the Supreme Court
sometimes gets it wrong. Or, to put it in terms emphasized by Attorney General Meese,
and conceded even by most of his critics, there is a difference between the Constitution
and the Court's decisions interpreting it.2 " Disputes over the best substantive
interpretations of the Constitution should not be confused with analytically distinct-
and often difficult-questions about the appropriate roles of each branch of
government in the development of constitutional meaning. For example, Reagan's
substantive agenda for constitutional change received (and, in my view, deserved)
strong criticism on the merits, but entirely separate (and, in my view, deserving of
mixed reviews) is the question whether, in seeking to promote change, Reagan acted
inappropriately, in the sense of exceeding his presidential authority. Conflation of
these issues-and misguided criticism of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation-
encourages a move from judicial supremacy to judicial imperialism, which ill serves
constitutional democracy.
Professor H. Jefferson Powell has described American constitutional law (including
as interpreted by judges) as "an historically extended tradition of argument, a means
(indeed, a central means) by which this political society has debated an ever-shifting
set of political issues. 267 Through his compelling "historicist" account of
constitutional controversies throughout United States history,268 Professor Powell
264. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1076 ("If one doesn't like the decisions of the
Rehnquist Court, one should really have been putting more Democrats in the White House
during the 1970s and 1980s. Put another way, if you don't like what the Court is doing now, you
(or your parents) shouldn't have voted for Ronald Reagan.").
265. See Kramer, supra note 29, at 7.
266. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REv. 26 (2000).
267. POWELL, supra note 28, at 6.
268. Professor Powell examines a series of controversies from 1790 through 1944 with the
express purpose of illustrating what he calls an "'historicist' interpretation of constitutional
law-specifically, that constitutional law is thoroughly historical, dependent throughout on the
contingencies of time and political circumstance, and that it is a coherent tradition of argument."
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illustrates that the political nature of constitutional law, far from being cause for
concern, is the source of American constitutionalism's "integrity and
distinctiveness" 269 and cause for celebration. Because it both shapes and is shaped by
politics, constitutional law over time both "displays continuity and intellectual
coherence, 270 and also "offers the means by which people of fundamentally different
views, beliefs, origins, and visions can become and remain a political community. ' 27'
Although a thorough consideration of the appropriate roles of the President and
Congress in constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe,
as I have discussed elsewhere, that the political branches bring value to the debate
about constitutional meaning. 272 Contrary to the Rehnquist Court's recent
pronouncements (and also contrary to the Reagan administration's claim that
constitutional meaning is fixed by the specific intent of the Framers), the American
people appropriately take part in the development of constitutional meaning, including
through their elected representatives. The Rehnquist Court is wrong to fail even to
consider this value, especially in its treatment of Congress's Section 5 authority. Also
wrong, though, are those who advocate interpretative autonomy for Congress and the
President and deny any special role for the Supreme Court-a position the Reagan
administration sometimes approached, at least with regard to the President's
conflicting constitutional views.273 Worthy of consideration and continued study is past
governmental practice: contrary to the Reagan Justice Department's professed
approach, past executive branch practice generally supports careful attention to
context, including the particular power being exercised and the nature of the
constitutional issue. 74
A third lesson: we should seek consensus on the principle that both the President
and the Senate appropriately may consider the legal philosophies and ideologies of
individuals under consideration for judicial appointments. As Balkin and Levinson
note, the relationship between constitutional law and politics, as mediated by judicial
appointments, is only "roughly" and "imperfectly" democratic. Attention is due to the
specific ways in which that connection is rough and imperfect. Some protections of
judicial independence, of course, are constitutionally appropriate, even critical, but at
least one significant obstacle to democratic influences deserves attention: the ways in
Id. at 7. He concludes:
If judges accepted [the historicist interpretation], they would take a somewhat
more modest approach to their role in the constitutional order than is customary, at
least among justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. If the rest of us took it seriously,
the historicist account would demand of politicians and citizens alike that they
recognize their, our, responsibilities in maintaining a constitutional order that is
open to and inclusive of all.
Id.
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 213.
272. See Johnsen, supra note 133.
273. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
274. See Johnsen, supra note 133; see also Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the
Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 359 (2000).
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which issues ofjudicial selection are publicly understood and discussed.
Professor Powell has concluded that one of our "shared constitutional first
principles," legitimated by history, is that the American people and the political
branches of government should seek to change what they view as incorrect judicial
constitutional interpretations, including "by appointing, as opportunity arises, judges
likely to take a different position." 275 Yet the importance ofjudicial selection and the
relevance of nominees' legal philosophies and views remain, in my view,
underappreciated by the American public276 and also contested by some government
officials and other public figures in ways harmful to appropriate democratic influences.
At a recent Senate subcommittee hearing entitled Judicial Nominations 2001: Should
Ideology Matter?, for example, several former high-ranking government officials
testified that the appropriate answer to that question is "no." 277 Senators who vote not
to confirm a nominee based on his or her substantive views risk attack for "Borking"
candidates and using "ideological litmus tests." The lack of consensus that senators
appropriately may consider ideology creates incentives for senators who vote against
nominees based on concern about their legal views not to be forthright about their
reasons, and to search instead for alternative explanations, such as personal character
issues--ethical lapses, lack of "judicial temperament," personal prejudice-which in
turn threaten to degrade the process.
The Reagan administration strongly and explicitly endorsed the relevance of the
275. POWELL, supra note 28, at 208. Professor Powell writes:
The judiciary is not infallible; therefore, the people and the political branches of
the federal government ought to take appropriate steps to change the constitutional
views of the judiciary, when they believe the courts have erred, through
constitutional amendment, litigation, and the appointments process .... The use of
the appointments process for this purpose raises some hard questions in
application, but despite the occasional protest by those substantively opposed to
whatever change is sought, the principle is settled.
Id. at 207-08. While I agree with Professor Powell that the principle should be settled, as I
discuss, I view the protest that continues as significant and troubling.
276. Conventional wisdom in American politics holds that the voters pay little attention to
positions on judicial selection in choosing among candidates. For example, Professor Laurence
Tribe opened an account of the great impact the choice of Justices has on Americans' lives, with
the observation "it is unlikely that the [1984] election reflected, in any decisive way, the
considered views of more than a handful of the American people about the sorts of Justices they
would want a reelected President Reagan or a newly elected President Mondale to nominate."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY ix (1985). Balkin and Levinson's theory nonetheless retains
force because political parties and interest groups (with influence over political parties) tend to
care about judicial selection far more than the general electorate.
277. See The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
C. Boyden Gray, former Counsel to President George H.W. Bush, testified: "'Should ideology
matter?' I can answer in one word: No." Id. at 27 (prepared statement). Douglas W. Kmiec, who
served in the Department of Justice as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel under President Reagan, testified: "To measure nominees by an ideological litmus-test
or place the burden on nominees to justify their ideological conformity is the equivalent of
partisan, outcome driven court-packing." Id. at 193.
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legal philosophies and views ofjudicial nominees.2 78 President Reagan acted within
the constitutional prerogatives of the presidency in considering the legal views of
nominees, and the Senate just as surely is entrusted with the authority to consider those
same views in the exercise of its advice and consent role. Indeed, for the Senate to do
otherwise would create an imbalance in the federal judiciary. 279 Above all, we should
encourage forthrightness regarding judicial selection decisions and thus make possible
accountability and appropriate public participation in the development of constitutional
meaning.
Finally, Reagan's success underscores that substantial constitutional change is
possible and that the development of coherent constitutional interpretations and visions
for change can help make it happen. The detailed constitutional views advanced by the
Reagan administration were ambitious in their challenge to settled judicial precedent
and even seemed unrealistic at the time, including in their challenge to the Court's
broad and deferential stance toward congressional power. Moreover, the Reagan
administration clearly did not develop its constitutional vision in isolation, but
benefited from the work and support of legal academics, 2 0 practitioners, advocacy
groups, and others who continue their work, long after Reagan has left office.
President Reagan's close attention to constitutional law and his success in influencing
the course of its development should inspire greater energy and creativity among all
who care about our Nation's constitutional future.
278. To quote again the Reagan Justice Department: "There are few factors that are more
critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more often overlooked, than the values
and philosophies of the men and women who populate the third co-equal branch of the national
government-the federal judiciary." THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 21, at v.
279. See Dawn Johnsen, Tipping the Scale, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2002, at 15
(discussing the Reagan/Meese Department of Justice reports and the use of ideology in judicial
selection).
280. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ORIGINAL
MEANING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK (1987) (both citing numerous books and articles).
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